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Starnes v. Department Of Public Safety7/17/2000
procedurally barred from asserting it for the first time on appeal to this court. Id. at 82, 447 S.E.2d at 191.
Accordingly, because Department did not afford Starnes an administrative hearing within the statutorily mandated ten-day period, it lacked subject matter jurisdiction to sustain the suspension. The circuit court, therefore, did not err in ordering Department to reinstate Starnes's license.
Additionally, we note the legislature recently clarified the import of Department's failure to hold a timely hearing. In 1999, the legislature amended § 56-5-2951(H) to provide that if Department fails to hold a hearing within thirty days of the receipt of a request, it must issue an order explaining the delay and schedule a new hearing. If, however, Department "does not issue a written order within ten days or fails to schedule or hold a subsequent hearing, the person shall have his driver's license, permit, or nonresident operating privilege reinstated." S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2951(H) (Supp. 1999). This amendment is indicative of the legislature's intent to require Department to strictly adhere to the mandated time frames involved in license suspensions.
Department further argues the circuit court erred in reinstating Starnes's license because it failed to provide him with a written order notifying him of the hearing officer's decision within thirty days of the administrative hearing. The statutory provision in question states: "A written order must be issued to the person upholding the suspension of the person's license, permit, or nonresident's operating privilege, or denying the issuance of a license or permit within thirty days after the conclusion of the administrative hearing." S.C. Code Ann. § 56-5-2951(H) (Supp. 1998) (emphasis added). Department admits it did not meet this requirement. Accordingly, we also affirm the reinstatement of Starnes's license on this ground for the reasons discussed above.
Because we affirm the circuit court's decision to revoke the suspension and reinstate Starnes's license, we need not consider Department's final argument concerning the allegedly faulty simulator test. See, e.g., Futch v. McAllister Towing of Georgetown, Inc., 335 S.C. 598, 518 S.E.2d 591 (1999) (noting that an appellate court need not address appellant's remaining issues when its determination of a prior issue is dispositive); Dickinson, 288 S.C. at 191, 341 S.E.2d at 136 ("Having found the twenty (20) day period to be mandatory it is not necessary for us to reach the remaining exceptions.").
AFFIRMED.
HEARN, C.J., and MOREHEAD, A.J., concur.
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