 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Moeller8/30/2000
mined him and called its own expert witness to refute Randall's conclusions.
[ ] On appeal, Moeller argues that because there was no forensic evidence tending to connect the knife to the crime, Randall's opinion was more prejudicial than probative and should have been excluded. He further contends the report was untimely offered and therefore should have been excluded. We disagree.
DECISION
[ ] SDCL 19-15-2 guides us on the admission of expert testimony. It requires that such testimony "assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue." SDCL 19-15-2; Moeller I, 1996 SD 60, , 548 NW2d at 485. "'Any fact that tends to connect an accused with the commission of a crime is relevant and has probative value.'" Moeller I, 1996 SD 60, , 548 NW2d at 486 (quoting State v. Johnson, 316 NW2d 652, 654 (SD 1982) (other citations omitted)). Although relevant, expert testimony may be excluded if it is more prejudicial than probative. SDCL 19-12-3. To warrant exclusion, the evidence must show "unfair prejudice." State v. Wright, 1999 SD 50, , 593 NW2d 792, 799. "Unfair prejudice is associated with 'facts that arouse the jury's hostility or sympathy for one side without regard to the probative value of the evidence.'" Moeller I, 1996 SD 60, , 548 NW2d at 486 (citation omitted).
[ ] A review of the record shows that while Randall's report could not definitively link Moeller to the crime, it was another piece of the circumstantial case that tended to connect him to the crime. See Moeller I, 1996 SD 60, , 548 NW2d at 486. Moeller's assertion, that an expert's testimony is not legally probative if it is based upon a mere possibility, is without merit. Such arguments go to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
[ ] We cannot accept Moeller's argument that Randall's testimony in the second trial went far beyond his testimony in the first trial. First, State is not limited to evidence presented in the first trial. Next, Randall was not given the opportunity in the first trial to examine the knife and testify regarding his opinion whether it could have inflicted the wounds. It was not error to allow Randall to examine and opine about the knife.
[ ] Nor do we find reversible error in the fact that Randall's report was submitted after jury selection had commenced. As stated previously in regard to Dr. Wehrenberg's soil report, we do not equate late disclosure with suppression, especially where the defense counsel made use of the information at trial. Here, the record indicates that Moeller's counsel did an admirable job of exposing the weaknesses in Randall's testimony and report.
ISSUE 8.
[ ] The trial court did not err in its jury instructions defining aggravating circumstances.
FACTS
[ ] During the trial's sentencing phase, State presented evidence attempting to establish that Moeller's murder of Becky was "outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible, or inhuman in that it involved torture, depravity of mind, or an aggravated battery to the victim." SDCL 23A-27A-1(6). The jury returned a verdict of death by lethal injection, indicating that it found beyond a reasonable doubt that the offense involved all three factors of torture, depravity of mind, and an aggravated battery to the victim.
[ ] On appeal, Moeller argues that the trial court's definition of aggravating circumstance is unconstitutionally vague because it fails to channel the jury's sentencing discretion. He claims such instructions violated the cruel and unusual punishment clause of the Eighth Amendment and the due process guarantees of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments to the Unit
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 South Dakota DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|