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State v. Perez-Cervantes8/24/2000
mas' blood could be enough to cause a 'heart attack or a jolt,' he agreed that 'the presence of blood in {Thomas'} stab wound' ruled out the possibility that Thomas' death was due to a drug overdose. VRP vol. II at 28. He, therefore, classified Thomas' death as a 'homicide,' rather than as 'undetermined,' the classification for a death by drug overdose. VRP vol. II at 43. Dr. Lacsina did not express an opinion as to whether any amount of cocaine and/or heroin could independently cause spontaneous rupturing of a drug user's vascular structure. He did indicate, however, that the toxicology test results did not change his opinion as to cause of death. Following presentation of the evidence, the State moved to limit closing argument by defense counsel 'relating to the cause of death.' VRP vol. III at 9. After hearing argument on the motion, the trial judge stated:
'{t}here are other contributing factors; that's the evidence, contributing factors. But there is no testimony, none has been offered, that those factors rise to the level of cause.' VRP vol. III at 13 (emphasis added). He, therefore, granted the State's motion and prohibited defense counsel from arguing to the jury that Thomas' drug use or failure to seek medical care caused his death.
The trial judge instructed the jury regarding proximate cause, and intervening cause, as follows:
If you are satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt that the acts of the defendant were a proximate cause of the death of the deceased, it is not a defense that the conduct of the deceased or another may also have been a proximate cause of the death.
If a proximate cause of the death was a later independent intervening act of the deceased or another that the defendant, in the exercise of ordinary care, could not reasonably have anticipated as likely to happen, the defendant's acts are superseded by the intervening cause and are not a proximate cause of the death.
However, if in the exercise of ordinary care, the defendant should reasonably have anticipated the intervening cause, that cause does not supersede defendant's original acts and defendant's acts are a proximate cause. It is not necessary that the sequence of events or the particular injury be foreseeable. It is only necessary that the death fall within the general field of danger which the defendant should have reasonably anticipated. Instruction 15, Clerk's Papers (CP) at 79. Perez-Cervantes' counsel did not object to the giving of this instruction.
Despite the trial court's previous ruling, Perez-Cervantes' counsel attempted to present argument that Thomas' drug use caused his death. The trial judge sustained the State's objection to the argument, indicating, 'you're arguing the cause of death and I've already ruled on that.' VRP vol. III at 53. The jury subsequently returned a verdict of guilty on the charge of murder in the second degree.
Perez-Cervantes appealed to the Court of Appeals, Division Two. That court reversed the trial court, concluding that because '{t}he trial court, in effect, took the question of cause of death from the jury and directed a verdict' of guilty, 'Perez-Cervantes's due process rights were violated.' State v. Perez-Cervantes, 90 Wn. App. 566, 573, 952 P.2d 204, review granted, 136 Wn.2d 1008, 966 P.2d 904 (1998). We granted the State's petition for review.
II.
The State asserts that the Court of Appeals wrongly concluded that the trial court erred in precluding Perez-Cervantes' counsel from arguing to the jury that Thomas' death was caused by his use of drugs, or his failure to seek medical attention. In support of this argument, it contends that 'when there is no evidence .
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