State v. Perez-Cervantes8/24/2000
One such case is State v. Little, 57 Wn.2d 516, 358 P.2d 120 (1961). The facts there were that a prison inmate was rendered comatose as a consequence of a beating at the hands of another inmate. Following the assault, the victim was transferred to Western State Hospital for neurosurgery. Witnesses testified that while at the hospital, the victim fell from his bed on several occasions. Following the victim's death, the person who administered the beating was charged with second degree murder and was convicted at trial. The defendant argued to this court on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support an inference that his actions proximately caused the victim's death. More specifically, he contended that the chain of causation between his action and the victim's death was broken by the victim falling from the bed, as a result of the inattention of medical personnel. We disagreed that this was a superseding cause, concluding that '{m}alpractice with respect to the original injury or wound is no defense, whereas malpractice resulting in new and different injuries which prove fatal would be a defense.' Little, 57 Wn.2d at 522. We reasoned that the victim 'was in bed as a direct result of the beating administered by appellant,' and thus his falls from the hospital bed did not break the chain of causation. Little, 57 Wn.2d at 522.
Our holding in Little was in keeping with earlier opinions from this court, which limit the viability of subsequent medical malpractice as a defense to a charge of murder. State v. Baruth, 47 Wash. 283, 296, 91 P. 977 (1907) provides a good, early example:
Where one unlawfully inflicts upon the person of another a wound calculated to endanger or destroy life, it is no defense to a charge of murder where death ensues to show that the wounded person might have recovered if the wound had been more skillfully treated. . . . He must show that the negligent and unskillful treatment was the sole cause of death, before he can escape the consequences of his unlawful act on this ground. Accord State v. Karsunky, 197 Wash. 87, 99, 84 P.2d 390 (1938); State v. Richardson, 197 Wash. 157, 164, 84 P.2d 699 (1938).
Interestingly, Division Two of the Court of Appeals previously issued an opinion consistent with this line of authority. State v. Yates, 64 Wn. App. 345, 824 P.2d 519, review denied, 119 Wn.2d 1017, 833 P.2d 1390 (1992). In that case, the defendant raped, stabbed, strangled, and shot the victim, rendering her permanently comatose. The victim's family and her doctors later decided to remove her feeding tube and respirator, and she subsequently died. Yates was charged with, and convicted of, first degree murder. On appeal, he argued that the trial court erred in refusing to instruct the jury that the State had the burden of proving that the removal of life support was not a new and independent cause of the victim's death. The court affirmed, holding that '{w}hen life support is removed, the cause of death is not the removal, but whatever agency generated the need for the life support in the first instance.' Yates, 64 Wn. App. at 351 (citing In re Guardianship of Grant, 109 Wn.2d 545, 564, 747 P.2d 445, 757 P.2d 534 (1987)).
Although the aforementioned decisions deal with the question of whether negligent medical treatment of a seriously injured crime victim or the withdrawal of medical treatment from such a victim is a superseding cause of death, we considered circumstances more directly analogous to the instant case in State v. Leech, 114 Wn.2d 700, 790 P.2d 160 (1990). There, the defendant was convicted of the felony murder of a firefighter who died of carbon monoxide poisoning while fighting a fire that was
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 Washington DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|