 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
Board of County Commissioners of Teton County v. Bassett7/25/2000
nto Coziah's car which was going approximately thirty miles per hour. Coziah and Bassett were injured, and Ortega was arrested.
Appellees sued the Wyoming Highway Patrol and Sheriff's officers alleging that they were negligent in pursuing Ortega, failing to warn appellees of the danger, and in operating the roadblock. At the close of the evidence, appellants sought instruction to the jury that the officers could be liable only if their conduct was extreme and outrageous, citing DeWald v. State, 719 P.2d 643 (Wyo. 1986). They also objected to the absence of Ortega from the verdict form as a non-party actor whose fault must be compared with that of appellants. The State moved for judgment for Sergeant Wilson on the basis of qualified immunity.
In rulings which are the basis of these appeals, the district court refused appellants' motion for judgment as to all but two of the named officers, ruled that DeWald did not apply in the circumstances shown by the evidence, rejected the claim of qualified immunity, and refused to include Ortega as an "actor" on the grounds that his conduct was willful and wanton, citing Danculovich v. Brown, 593 P.2d 187 (Wyo. 1979). The verdict form included as those whose fault should be compared Coziah, who was driving appellees' car, the Wyoming Highway Patrol, the Sheriff's officers, and as a non-party, the National Park Service. The jury allocated 0% fault to Coziah, 40% fault to the Wyoming Highway Patrol, 20% fault to the Sheriff's officers, and 40% fault to the National Park Service.
Alleged errors in instructions and form of verdict are reviewed to determine if the instructions present an accurate statement of the governing law. Betts v. Crawford, 965 P.2d 680, 686 (Wyo. 1998) (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Shrader, 882 P.2d 813, 832 (Wyo. 1994)). We review denial of the motion for judgment as a matter of law taking as true all of the non-moving party's evidence with its reasonable inferences, affording no deference to the district court's determination, to inquire whether a reasonable jury could reach but one verdict. Anderson v. Duncan, 968 P.2d 440, 442 (Wyo. 1998).
Since it is dispositive, we turn first to the question of whether Ortega, whose conduct was willful and wanton or intentional, should have been included among the actors whose fault would be determined and compared with that of the other actors by the jury in apportioning fault among the actors as required by Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-1-109. Appellees contend, and the district court held, that Ortega's willful and wanton or intentional conduct could not be compared with the conduct of appellants, citing Danculovich for the proposition that the conduct of a willfully and wantonly negligent, or by necessary implication, intentional tortfeasor ("willful actor") cannot be compared under Wyo. Stat. Ann § 1-1-109 with that of a merely negligent ("negligent") actor because the two varieties of conduct, willful and negligent, differ not merely in degree but in kind and therefore cannot be compared. We disagree for several reasons.
Unlike the version before the 1994 amendment to Wyo. Stat. Ann 1-1-109, which used "negligence," its present iteration introduces the more inclusive term "fault" and defines it as including conduct that is "in any measure negligent" eliminating degrees or varieties of negligence consistent with one of the purposes of the statute, that is to ameliorate the harshness of the doctrine of contributory negligence. The comparative negligence statute remedied the injustice of the doctrine of contributory negligence by stating that a plaintiff's negligence prevents recovery only in proportion as it causes plaintiff's damages.
The u
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Wyoming DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|