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State v. Gaffney2/24/2000
ys and to give the suspect notice of the administrative consequences of refusing to provide a sample" for testing. State v. Krantz, 174 Ariz. 211, 214, 848 P.2d 296, 299 (App. 1992). Because Gaffney readily agreed to Hill's requests that he provide blood and urine samples, he was never subject to a suspension of his license under the implied consent law. We find nothing in either the statute's language or its legislative history suggesting that the admonitions were otherwise required because Gaffney faced potential criminal charges. See State v. Vannoy, 177 Ariz. 206, 866 P.2d 874 (App. 1993) (civil license suspension under implied consent law separate from and unrelated to criminal DUI prosecution); Krantz (civil sanction under implied consent law not intended to provide shield for impaired drivers).
Our interpretation is further supported by the language of § 28-1321(C), which provides that the tests authorized in subsection A may be administered to a person who is unconscious or otherwise incapable of refusing the test. Test results from such a person presumably could be introduced in a criminal proceeding against the person, notwithstanding that he or she, like Gaffney, had not been advised of the potential consequences of refusing or agreeing to submit to such tests. This reflects the fact that the person, having operated a motor vehicle in this state, has already implicitly consented to such tests. § 28-1321(A). See Ricard v. Arizona Dep't of Transp., 187 Ariz. 633, 636, 931 P.2d 1143, 1146 (App. 1997) ("A motorist arrested within Arizona for driving under the influence is deemed to have given 'consent' to a test to determine blood alcohol content."). This is so regardless of whether the person lacks knowledge about the ramifications or consequences of that action. Cf. Gaunt v. Motor Vehicle Div., 136 Ariz. 424, 666 P.2d 524 (App. 1983) (neither DUI suspect's mistaken belief, confusion, or intoxication can excuse suspect's refusal to take test). In sum, we find nothing in the statute's language, history, or purpose suggesting that the statute's warnings must be provided when drivers give express consent to a test of their blood, breath, or urine.()
Finally, we agree with the state that a police department's policy of reading the admonitions provided in the implied consent affidavit, an administrative form, before a suspect submits to tests cannot alter or enlarge the requirements of the statute. See Braun v. Motor Vehicle Div., 161 Ariz. 487, 779 P.2d 362 (App. 1989) (law enforcement agency's internal policy of offering DUI suspects option of breath test before blood test did not create irrevocable election binding on agency as to which test to offer first because implied consent statute did not mandate any particular order; officer who violates internal policy may be required to explain action to superiors, but violation does not involve statutory rights).
Having found that Officer Hill's actions did not violate the terms of the implied consent statute, we conclude that the trial court clearly erred in suppressing the test results on this ground. Although Gaffney urges us to affirm the court's ruling on the alternate ground that the state lacked probable cause to arrest him, thus tainting his subsequent consent to submit to the tests, the trial court declined to rule on this issue. Accordingly, we do not consider it, but note that Gaffney may reurge that argument should the state refile the charges.()
The trial court's order suppressing Gaffney's blood and urine test results is vacated.
PHILIP G. ESPINOSA, Chief Judge
CONCURRING:
J. WILLIAM BRAMMER, JR., Presiding Judge
JOSEPH W. HOWARD, Judge
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