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State v. Alger2/9/2000
uire knowledge of reasonable grounds to believe that the defendant was operating while intoxicated." These statements establish the court applied the correct standard. Officer Sivinski's Knowledge The State contends Officer Sivinski was aware of facts and circumstances that afforded him reasonable grounds to believe Alger was driving while intoxicated. Specifically, the State points to the following evidence: (1) Alger ran a stop sign; (2) Alger was speeding; (3) Alger gave no indication he saw the other vehicle; (4) Sivinski saw alcohol at the scene and a fellow officer told Sivinski one can of beer appeared to have been consumed before the crash; (5) Sivinski noted Alger was not alert and disoriented. None of these facts, either independently or together, would have warranted a prudent person to believe Alger was driving while intoxicated. The only facts which do establish this nexus were properly rejected by the district court as supporting a reasonable grounds determination and the State does not challenge those portions of the ruling. For example, the State does not challenge the district court's determination that Sivinski's conversation with Alger after the blood sample was taken cannot support the reasonable grounds determination. The State also does not take issue with the court's determination that certain of Sivinski's pretrial testimony was not credible. Specifically, Sivinski testified Alger admitted at the accident scene he had been drinking alcohol. The court pointed out, however, that Sivinski did not mention this admission in his four page, single spaced report. The State finally does not challenge the court's finding that Sivinski did not have an understanding he needed reasonable grounds to invoke implied consent and, consequently, did not administer any tests which might have revealed alcohol impairment. It is undisputed Alger's speech was not slurred and his eyes were not bloodshot at the time of the accident and no witnesses at the scene suggested Alger was alcohol impaired. Accordingly, we conclude Sivinski did not have reasonable grounds to believe Alger was operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. To conclude otherwise would subvert one of the three purposes behind Iowa Code section 321J.6: "to prevent citizens from indiscriminate testing or harassment." State v. Satern, 516 N.W.2d 839, 841 (Iowa 1994). C. Officers' Shared Knowledge The State contends, even if the information within Sivinski's knowledge is not sufficient to support a finding of "reasonable grounds," Officer McClure possessed additional information that provided reasonable grounds for removal of the blood sample. It is established that " hen police officers are acting in concert, the knowledge of one is presumed shared by all." Owens, 418 N.W.2d at 342. Officer McClure was on duty at the Storm Lake Police Department when a radio dispatch arrived from Deputy Sivinski requesting that an officer go the hospital to obtain blood specimens from the drivers of two cars involved in an accident. McClure was not at the accident scene and testified he knew nothing about the accident. However, he responded to Sivinski's dispatch and proceeded to the hospital. As Alger was being wheeled into the emergency room, McClure detected "an odor of an intoxicating beverage coming from his person." Later, as McClure approached Alger, he noticed Alger's "eyes were bloodshot and an odor of intoxicating beverage coming from his person." McClure read Alger the implied consent advisory, ensured Alger understood it, then requested a blood specimen. Alger consented and signed the form. The district court concluded McClure's additional insights into Alger's appearance could not rehabilitate the reasonable grounds determination made by Sivinski. The court stated: Offi
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