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State v. Alger2/9/2000
cer McClure testified that he invoked implied consent at the request of Deputy Sheriff Sivinski; that he did not make any determination that the basis for a blood test existed and that any observations he made did not affect the blood test. He also testified that the decision to request the blood samples was made before he (McClure) even got to the hospital. à It is obvious that Officer McClure testified that the observations he made of the defendant did not affect the decision whether or not to obtain the blood sample. In fact, he did not make that determination. Those observations were made after Deputy Sivinski had ordered the blood test. Therefore, they could not have been a part of the factual basis for invoking implied consent. (emphasis in original).
We agree with and adopt the court's reasoning. It is true the pertinent time frame for determining reasonable grounds is "at the time action was required." Satern, 516 N.W.2d at 841. However, the requesting officer must have reasonable grounds to believe a person was intoxicated while driving. Accepting McClure's testimony that Alger smelled of alcohol and had blood shot eyes, McClure nevertheless had no reason to believe Alger was driving drunk and, as we have previously noted, neither did Sivinski. Therefore, their combined observations cannot establish reasonable grounds to support the taking of blood.
We acknowledge this is a very close case. However, under the applicable standard of review, we cannot conclude the district court erred in sustaining Alger's motion to suppress the blood sample and implied consent form. Accordingly, we affirm.
AFFIRMED.
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