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State v. Campbell7/6/2004
e for the [third] conviction and not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction. [FN1] *117 The State further contends the sentence **7 should be without benefit of probation or suspension of sentence, in accordance with La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 G. According to the State, it was not the Legislature's intent for third and fourth DWI offenders to escape the recidivist punishment provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1 when the defendant has other non-DWI felony convictions.
FN1. The State argues for a minimum sentence of forty months and a maximum sentence of ten years. While the calculation of forty months is correct (two-thirds of the longest possible sentence for the conviction [third offense DWI] ) as the longest possible term for that conviction is five years (sixty months), the calculation of ten years is problematic. The maximum sentence is "not more than twice the longest possible sentence prescribed for a first conviction[.]" Here that would translate to one year, as the longest possible sentence for a first DWI conviction is six months. La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 B(1). The State is obviously arguing for a maximum based upon twice the longest possible sentence for the third DWI conviction; the longest possible sentence for a third DWI conviction is five years. A reading with the calculation based on correct application of
the statutes would result in a minimum sentence that is longer than the maximum sentence. This application could lead to absurd consequences. We note this ambiguity for the sake of thoroughness, but we will not decide what the correct calculation of the maximum sentence should be, as we find the defendant is not subject to the sentencing provisions of La.Rev.Stat. 15:529.1. We reserve this issue for another time, as it could arise in the penalty enhancement calculation for other crimes subject to the habitual offender statute.
The defendant contends the State, in its haste to circumvent the legislative purpose for amending the sentencing of DWI offenders, overlooks the clear reading of the act itself. The defendant further argues in order to give the appropriate deference to the legislative branch, the judiciary must give great weight to the unambiguous legislative purpose of a statute.
The district court sentenced the defendant in accordance with La.Rev.Stat. 14:98 D(1), which provides, inter alia, "notwithstanding any other provision of law to the contrary ... the offender shall be imprisoned ... no[ ] more than five years ... [t]he remainder of the sentence of imprisonment shall be suspended ..." (Emphasis added).
Legislative intent is the fundamental question in all cases of statutory interpretation, and rules of statutory construction are designed to ascertain and enforce the intent of the statute. State v. Piazza, 596 So.2d 817, 819 (La.1992). The rules of statutory construction applicable in this case are those pertinent to conflicting statutes.
**8 It is presumed the Legislature enacts each statute with deliberation and with full knowledge of all existing laws on the same subject. Fontenot v. Reddell Vidrine Water Dist., 02-0439, p. 13 (La.1/14/03), 836 So.2d 14, 24. Thus, legislative language will be interpreted on the assumption that the Legislature was aware of existing statutes, rules of construction, and judicial decisions interpreting those statutes. Id. at p. 13-14; State v. Bedford, 01-2298, p. 3 (La.1/28/03), 838 So.2d 758, 760. It is further presumed the legislative branch intends to achieve a consistent body of law. Piazza, 596 So.2d at 819; 1A Norman J. Singer, Statutes and Statutory Construction § 23:9, p. 461 (6th ed.2002). Therefore, we proceed under the premise that in amending La.Rev.Stat. 14:98, the Legislature was aware that mandating su
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