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Commonwealth v. Magazu1/21/2000
ting liquor. See Commonwealth v. Connolly, 394 Mass. 169, 172 (1985); Commonwealth v. Riley, ante 463 (2000). It follows, therefore, that when the defendant continued to drive and, moments later, proceeded into Whitman, Leavitt had reason to believe the defendant was committing an offense in his presence and within his jurisdiction. Contrast Commonwealth v. Grise, 398 Mass. 247, 248 (1986), where, as noted in Commonwealth v. Savage, 430 Mass. 341, 344-345 (1999), the officers' observations, stop, and arrest all occurred outside the territorial limits of their authority.
Although Leavitt, while in Whitman and closely following the defendant, did not activate his siren or lights and attempt to overtake and stop him, we rely upon Commonwealth v. Owens, 414 Mass. 595 (1993), and conclude that he was in "pursuit," within the meaning of § 98A, at the time of the defendant's arrest in Hanson. In Owens, a Quincy police officer performed a routine stolen motor vehicle check on a car parked within his jurisdiction. His request for information revealed that although the car was not stolen, its owner was being sought on an outstanding arrest warrant for serious felony charges. When a man got into the car and began to drive off, the officer followed, but did not attempt to overtake him. The officer "radioed a request to have [the car] stopped at a specific traffic light. Prior to reaching the light, however, the driver of the stopped at a gasoline station" located just outside the officer's territorial limitations. The officer followed the car into the station, approached the driver, and made an investigative inquiry which led to the driver's arrest. Id. at 597-598. The threshold issue before the court was whether the officer acted outside his jurisdiction when arresting the defendant without a warrant. The court concluded that because the officer was within his jurisdiction when he received information regarding the warrant, he began his "pursuit" with reason to believe that the defendant had committed an arrestable offense. Id. at 599-600. In the present case, Leavitt "pursued" the defendant in the same manner as the officer in Owens. The distinction between the two cases is that in Owens, the officer's reason for following the defendant was based upon information requested by him, whereas in the instant case, Leavitt's reasons for following the defendant into Hanson were based upon his personal observations.
Leavitt's reasons for following the defendant were based upon his observations of an arrestable offense, the commission of which, as observed by Leavitt, continued into his territorial authority. In our view, Leavitt's observations must be deemed just as reliable as the information held sufficient in Owens. Further, although the defendant argues that § 98A requires "pursuit" more frenetic than that which here occurred, Owens indicates otherwise.
Accordingly, the judgment of dismissal is reversed, and the matter is remanded to the District Court for further proceedings on the complaint.
So ordered.
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