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Staton v. Director of Revenue3/21/2000
his case, the first two elements are not disputed. The only issue presented for review is whether Staton refused to submit to the breath test.
Discussion
The Director argues that Staton's reason for his refusal (that there was too much time elapsed between the driving and the offer to take the test) is irrelevant. The Director relies on Williams, 996 S.W.2d 127, in which the driver refused a blood test. At trial, the driver in Williams explained that he did not like needles because he had contracted hepatitis from an infected needle. Id. at 128. The trial court held that the driver had not voluntarily refused a test of his blood or his breath. Id. This court, however, reversed the trial court, holding that Williams had refused the test. Id. at 129. The Director argues that the Williams case indicates that the driver does not have the authority to decide for himself whether it is appropriate for him to take the test. We agree that in looking at whether there was a refusal, we do not view the record from the subjective point of view of the driver. In Berry, 885 S.W.2d 326, the driver contended that he had no memory of being offered the test or of refusing the test. He believed the pain of his injuries from the collision in which he was involved must have blocked his ability to effectively refuse. The driver's contention did not avail. Citing Cartwright v. Director of Revenue, 824 S.W.2d 38 (Mo. App. 1991), a case the court found indistinguishable (because there the driver also could not remember refusing the test), the court reversed the trial court ruling in favor of the driver. Berry, 885 S.W.2d at 327.
The Director's arguments and authorities do not persuade us that a time delay in offering the test is necessarily irrelevant to whether a driver is entitled to refuse the test. The arguments persuade us only that the reasonableness of a time delay between the arrest and the offer of the test must be judged objectively under the particular circumstances of the case. The statute obviously contemplates a relationship between the arrest, the reasonable grounds, and the refusal of the test. While we also assume there is an implied "reasonableness" requirement as a general principle of statutory construction, any issue of reasonableness would not be viewed from the subjective viewpoint of the driver. In any event, Staton cannot be heard to complain about the delay, because the delay was occasioned directly by Staton's own escape from custody. Staton deceived Trooper Landi by claiming he needed to urinate, and then fled, eluding capture for almost five hours. He is accordingly estopped from complaining about the delay for which he was directly responsible. See 28 Am. Jur. 2d Estoppel and Waiver, sections 26-29 (1966); State ex rel. Consol. School Dist. No. 2 v. Haid, 328 Mo. 739, 41 S.W.2d 806, 808-10 (1931) (court may apply estoppel even if not pleaded, if the essential facts appear from the case). The trial court was not precluded from a finding that Staton refused the test.
Conclusion
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
Separate Opinion:
None
Page 1 2 Missouri DUI Attorneys
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