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DiPietro v. Secretary of State7/24/2002
Stephen W. DiPietro appeals from the judgment of the Superior Court (Cumberland County, Warren, J.) affirming the Secretary of State's six-year suspension of DiPietro's driver's license. DiPietro argues that the Superior Court erred in holding that the Secretary of State had the authority to, without a hearing, impose a suspension that was longer than the 18-month suspension imposed by the court at DiPietro's sentencing for operating under the influence (OUI). [FN1] We affirm the Superior Court judgment.
FN1. Title 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(1) (1996) provides that "[a] person commits OUI, which is a Class D crime unless otherwise provided, if
that person operates a motor vehicle: A. While under the influence of intoxicants; or B. While having a blood-alcohol level of 0.08% or more."
I. CASE HISTORY
[ 2] DiPietro was arrested for OUI with a blood-alcohol content of 0.15% on September 20, 1996. On October 18, 1996, DiPietro was notified by the Secretary of State that his license had been suspended for "at least a 6 year period," because he *401 had three prior OUI offenses. [FN2] DiPietro requested an administrative hearing that was scheduled for December 3, 1996. The arresting officer did not appear at the hearing and, therefore, the administrative suspension was rescinded.
FN2. DiPietro had on his record two prior refusals, from two separate incidents, both on November 24, 1989, and also a conviction for OUI on February 16, 1990. Title 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2401(11) (1996) defines an OUI offense as "an OUI conviction or suspension for failure to submit to a test."
[ 3] In August 1997, DiPietro appeared before the Superior Court (Crowley, J.) and entered a plea of guilty to Class D OUI. See 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411 (1996). DiPietro was then sentenced to 10 days in the alternative sentencing program, fined $700, and his operating privileges were suspended for 18 months, based on the one prior OUI conviction alleged in the complaint. See id. § 2411(5)(B). [FN3] On September 8, 1997, the Secretary of State mailed DiPietro a letter informing him that, as a result of his conviction and prior OUI offenses, his license had been suspended for six years.
FN3. Title 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2411(5)(B) provides:
For a person having one previous OUI offense within a 10-year period:
(1) A fine of not less than $600, except that if the person failed to submit to a test at the request of a law enforcement officer, a fine of not less than $800;
(2) A period of incarceration of not less than 7 days, except that if the person failed to submit to a test at the request of a law enforcement officer, a period of incarceration of not less than 12 days;
(3) A court-ordered suspension of a driver's license for a period of 18 months; and
(4) In accordance with section 2416, a court-ordered suspension of the person's right to register a motor vehicle[.]
[ 4] In October 1999, DiPietro's new attorney asked the Bureau of Motor Vehicles why it had imposed a suspension greater than the one imposed by the court. The assistant director of driver's license services responded by stating that, pursuant to 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2451(3)(D) (1996), the Secretary of State was required to impose the minimum statutory period for suspension and that DiPietro's driving record indicated that the September 20, 1996, violation was his fourth OUI offense within a 10-year period. The letter also noted that DiPietro could treat the Bureau's letter as a final agency action for the purposes of appeal. [FN4] See M.R. Civ. P. 80C(a).
FN4. Although DiPietro did not challenge the administrative suspension until more than two years after the Secretary of State mailed him a notice of the six-year suspension, the Secretary of State did not challeng
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