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DiPietro v. Secretary of State7/24/2002
end. V.
[ 11] Administrative license suspensions are remedial, not punitive, in character. State v. Savard, 659 A.2d 1265, 1268 (Me.1995). Like a professional licensee, a driver's right to use his or her license is conditioned on the individual's observance of proper operating standards. Id. Title 29-A M.R.S.A. § 2453(1)(A)-(B) (1996) states that the purpose of administrative suspensions for excessive blood-alcohol is "[t]o provide maximum safety for all persons who travel on or otherwise use the public ways; and ... [t]o remove quickly from public ways those persons who have shown themselves to be a safety hazard by operating a motor vehicle with an excessive blood-alcohol level." This purpose is accomplished by post-conviction as well as pre-conviction administrative suspensions. The safety concern does not disappear when a driver has been sentenced by the court, particularly if the court-imposed suspension is less than required by 29-A M.R.S.A. §§ 2411(5) and 2451(3) because the court acted on an incomplete driving record.
*404 [ 12] DiPietro also argues that the Secretary of State's suspension of his driving privileges without a hearing violated his due process rights. DiPietro does not, however, challenge the number of prior OUI offenses indicated on his record. DiPietro was not entitled to a hearing on the equitable estoppel issue because the Secretary of State did not have the discretionary jurisdiction to consider DiPietro's claims of equitable estoppel. Accordingly, DiPietro's due process rights were not violated. See Berry v. Bd. of Trs., Maine State Ret. Sys., 663 A.2d 14, 19 (Me.1995) (holding that Board did not have equitable jurisdiction to apply the doctrine of equitable estoppel to its own decisions).
[ 13] Finally, DiPietro argues that the Secretary of State should be equitably estopped from asserting that the 1997 OUI was anything other than a second offense because the District Attorney misled DiPietro into believing that it was his second offense and that his license would not be suspended for any period longer than the suspension imposed by the court.
[ 14] "Estoppel bars the assertion of the truth by one whose misleading conduct has induced another to act to his detriment in reliance on what is untrue." Anderson v. Comm'r of Dep't of Human Servs., 489 A.2d 1094, 1099 (Me.1985). That reliance must be reasonable. See Roberts v. Maine Bonding & Cas. Co., 404 A.2d 238, 241 (Me.1979). The burden rests on DiPietro to demonstrate that he "justifiably relied upon affirmative misleading conduct of [a] ... governmental representative and was induced to his detriment to do an act that he would not otherwise have done." Koren v. Sec'y of State, 574 A.2d 895, 897 (Me.1990); accord Mathieu v. Comm'r of Human Servs., 562 A.2d 686, 689 (Me.1989); Roberts, 404 A.2d at 241.
[ 15] Because there is no evidence in the record that either the sentencing court or the District Attorney made any affirmative misrepresentations to either DiPietro or his counsel, and DiPietro and his counsel had notice from the Secretary of State's October 18, 1996, letter that DiPietro was facing a 6-year suspension at the administrative level, equitable estoppel does not bar the Secretary of State from asserting that DiPietro had three prior OUI offenses. Any reliance that DiPietro and his plea counsel placed on the court-imposed suspension was not reasonable in light of the notices they received and the experience they each had.
The entry is:
Judgment affirmed.
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