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Lacy v. Director of Revenue1/5/2000
This slip opinion is subject to revision and may not reflect the final opinion adopted by the Court.
Appeal From: Circuit Court of Stoddard County, Hon. Joe Z. Satterfield
Opinion Vote: DISMISSED. Prewitt, P.J., and Crow, J., concur
Opinion:
On May 14, 1999, this court issued an opinion in this cause. On August 24, 1999, by order of the Supreme Court of Missouri, this cause was transferred to that court. On December 21, 1999, the Supreme Court entered an order retransferring the cause to this court. The original opinion of this court, which follows, is now readopted and reissued.
The Director of Revenue (the director) appeals a judgment reinstating the motor vehicle operator's license of Jeffrey David Lacy. Mr. Lacy's license was suspended by the director pursuant to section 302.505 following his April 26, 1997, arrest for driving while intoxicated. A hearing was conducted as permitted by section 302.530 after which Mr. Lacy sought and obtained judicial review pursuant to section 302.535. The trial court ordered reinstatement of Mr. Lacy's driving privileges and "that the administrative suspension or revocation . . . be removed from driving record." Judgment was entered October 8, 1998. The Department of Revenue (the department) notified Mr. Lacy by letter dated October 22, 1998, that it had "received the final outcome of Petition for Trial DeNovo from the Circuit Court of Stoddard County." The letter advised Mr. Lacy that the suspension that was the subject of that action had been removed from his record. Mr. Lacy's license was returned with the letter. Later, on November 16, 1998, the director filed her notice of appeal.
Mr. Lacy filed a motion to dismiss the appeal because the director had fully complied with the judgment, thereby acquiescing in it. That motion is granted. The appeal is dismissed.
Court proceedings initiated by application for trial de novo directed to a final decision of the department are governed by rules of civil procedure. See section 302.535.1, RSMo 1994. The right to appeal a judgment is purely statutory. Sutton v. Goldenberg, 862 S.W.2d 515, 516 (Mo.App. 1993); Rule 81.01. An appeal may be taken from a final judgment in a civil case. Section 512.020, RSMo 1994; see Rule 81.05(a). However, a party who accepts the benefits of a favorable judgment or who acquiesces in an adverse judgment waives the right to have the judgment reviewed on appeal. Schulte v. Schulte, 949 S.W.2d 225, 227 (Mo.App. 1997). See also, Two Pershing Square, L.P. v. Boley, 981 S.W.2d 635, 638 (Mo.App. 1998), and Steen v. Colombo, 799 S.W.2d 169, 174 (Mo.App. 1990). The department's removal of the record of suspension from Mr. Lacy's record and return of his license in compliance with the trial court's judgment was an obvious acquiescence in that judgment.
The director responded to Mr. Lacy's motion to dismiss the appeal by reply brief. That brief cites no law rebutting the principle that a party acquiescing in an adverse judgment by complying with its directive is estopped from challenging the judgment on appeal. Rather, it argues, in essence, that a niche should be carved exempting appeals of license suspension and license revocation cases from this principle of law. It complains that the department endures "howls of protest . . . if a license is not returned relatively contemporaneously with the ink drying on the circuit court judgment."
The reply brief further suggests that to apply the principle on which Mr. Lacy relies in moving to dismiss the appeal would be detrimental to the rights of persons whose licenses are suspended and revoked and who are successful in appealing that action to
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