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Boyd v. State2/15/2000
recent supreme court decision, the applicable test in this situation is one of reasonableness and neither our supreme court nor the United States Supreme Court has articulated a concrete rule to determine what circumstances justify an investigatory stop. Floyd v. City of Crystal Springs, 98-KM-01252-SCT ( 18) (Miss. Ct. App. Nov. 24, 1999) (citing Green v. State, 348 So. 2d 428, 429 (Miss. 1977)). The question is approached on a case-by-case basis. Floyd, 98-KM-01252-SCT ( 18) (citing Green, 348 So. 2d at 429). Most traffic violations, including driving with a suspended license, are misdemeanors. Anyone committing a misdemeanor is technically involved in a "criminal activity". Id. at ( 24). Further, the Court noted that reasonable cause for an investigatory stop may be based on an officer's personal observation or on an informant's tip if it bears indicia of reliability. Id. at ( 30) (citing Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 147 (1972)).
. The finding by the majority that the trial court was in error is correct. The prosecutor simply told the trial court what the officer would have said regarding his knowledge of Boyd's suspended driver's license instead of calling him to the stand and having the police officer testify directly. Although I have no doubt that as an officer of the court, the prosecutor truthfully reported what Officer McCuan would have said, he simply cannot testify for Officer McCuan. I believe that had Officer McCuan testified to that end, there would be no reversible error on this point. If Officer McCuan had personal knowledge that nine months prior to the instant occasion that Boyd was given a citation for driving with a suspended driver's license and he knew that it would be impossible with that time frame for Boyd to have the license reinstated, that would certainly be a enough to support a reasonable suspicion grounded in specific and articulable facts as discussed in McCray. The majority seems to disagree.
. As the majority noted, relying on the knowledge that Boyd had a suspended driver's license in 1989 would be unacceptable. However, when a police officer testifies that he has personal knowledge that a person is driving with a suspended license either by familiarity with court records or issuance of a citation, I believe that probable cause can be firmly established under the guiding principles of Floyd and McCray. Of course, the information relied upon must be reasonably "fresh" as the majority notes, but that can vary from a few days to a few months depending upon the particular fact situation.
LEE, PAYNE AND THOMAS, JJ., JOIN THIS SEPARATE OPINION.
PAYNE, J., CONCURRING:
. I concur specially only to state that had Officer McCuan's memory of Boyd's suspended license been of more recent vintage, I would have followed the five cases cited in paragraph 12 as opposed to one 1987 Ohio County Court case as persuasive precedent.
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