State v. Dvorak1/19/2000
verything. I got to know today cause - it's such ridiculous charges I can't see where it could even go to court.
THE COURT: Well, if you're going to make a motion I think in fairness to Mr. Mehrer and to the Court and to everyone involved that we need to know this immediately, as soon as possible.
MR. DVORAK: Yeah. Well, I'm going to have to ask for an extension because I mean I can't go into court without an attorney. There's no way. I've talked to about five different attorneys and either the distance and a few other things that has come up and they just kind of put aside or whatever you want to call it.
THE COURT: Well, before I ask I'm going to ask Mr. Mehrer to respond on behalf of the State. I guess the Court's concern is even if the Court sees fit to grant you a continuance or extension because you're having difficulty in getting in an attorney is that going to make a difference or are we going to have the same problem whether it's two weeks from now or a month from now.
The court thereafter granted Dvorak another continuance and scheduled a March 8, 1999 pretrial conference and a March 15, 1999 trial. The court informed Dvorak:
Of course, if you fail to appear you know you have a bond posted and you have to appear or you forfeit your bond. If you get an attorney, of course, immediately have him file a notice of appearance so we know who the attorney is and I want - we've had this matter pending for quite sometime so you have to know now that it's not going to be continued again. I think we've gone probably a few steps too far already. We're stuck with that date and don't expect to come in at the last minute and ask for another extension or continuance.
[ ] At the March 8 pretrial conference, Dvorak appeared without counsel and informed the court he would waive his right to a jury trial. The court asked Dvorak whether he was voluntarily waiving his right to a jury trial, and Dvorak responded, in part, "I guess. I don't have no attorney so." Dvorak represented himself during the March 15, 1999 bench trial, and the court found him guilty of violating the domestic violence protection order.
II.
[ ] On appeal, now represented by court-appointed counsel, Dvorak argues he did not knowingly and intelligently waive his right to counsel in the trial court.
[ ] A criminal defendant's fundamental right to counsel is guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution and by N.D. Const. art. I, § 12. City of Fargo v. Rockwell, 1999 ND 125, 7, 597 N.W.2d 406; State v. Wicks, 1998 ND 76, 16, 576 N.W.2d 518; State v. Poitra, 1998 ND 88, 7, 578 N.W.2d 121. The denial of a defendant's right to counsel at trial is not subject to harmless error analysis and requires reversal of the defendant's conviction. Rockwell, at 7; Wicks, at 17; Poitra, at 7; State v. Harmon, 1997 ND 233, 16, 575 N.W.2d 635.
[ ] In Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 818-21 (1975), the United States Supreme Court held criminal defendants have a corollary right under the Sixth Amendment to conduct their own defense. Rockwell, 1999 ND 125, 8, 597 N.W.2d 406; Poitra, 1998 ND 88, 8, 578 N.W.2d 121; Harmon, 1997 ND 233, 16, 575 N.W.2d 635; State v. Hart, 1997 ND 188, 6, 569 N.W.2d 451. Criminal defendants who proceed pro se necessarily relinquish many of the benefits associated with the right to counsel, and in order to proceed pro se, they must voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently relinquish the benefits of counsel. Rockwell, at 8. A defendant need not have the skill and experience of a lawyer to competently and intelligently choose self-representation, but the defendant should be
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