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State v. Duquette12/30/1999
on has committed a felony while under the influence of alcohol or a controlled substance and that chemical tests . . . will produce material evidence in a felony prosecution." Section 66-8-111(A). We do not read the statute as narrowly as Defendant reads it. Based on our reading of the language in Section 66-8-111(A), we do not believe that a refusal is a condition precedent to issuance of a search warrant when, as here, there exists probable cause to believe Defendant committed a felony while under the influence of alcohol. [Even were a refusal required before a search warrant could be issued, we do not read refusal as narrowly as Defendant, and we believe that the Legislature intended the circumstances in this case to come within the refusal contemplated under the statute.] Additionally as we previously discussed, a purpose of the Implied Consent Act is to aid in the discovery and removal of intoxicated drivers from the highway. See McKay, 99 N.M. at 30, 653 P.2d at 861. Obtaining a search warrant when an alternative chemical test is necessary is consistent with this purpose. Thus, a search warrant for a chemical test may be issued pursuant to Section 66-8- 111(A) irrespective of whether a person refuses to take the test. Cf. Copeland, 105 N.M. at 32, 727 P.2d at 1347 (holding that because the language of the Implied Consent Act does not limit the number of chemical tests and multiple testing is consistent with the purpose of the Act, an extra blood test was permissible). Therefore, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying Defendant's motion for mistrial.
CONCLUSION
{21} We conclude that the motion to suppress and the motion for mistrial were properly denied and affirm Defendant's conviction.
{22} IT IS SO ORDERED.
JONATHAN B. SUTIN, Judge
WE CONCUR:
THOMAS A. DONNELLY, Judge
RUDY S. APODACA, Judge
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