Stockman v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds9/30/2004
The plaintiff, Ty Stockman, was convicted in 1990 of operating a motor vehicle while intoxicated. See G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(a)(1). Subsequently he was prosecuted for an *160 accident that occurred in February, 1992, wherein one Shannon Parker was killed. In that prosecution, the jury returned verdicts of guilty of involuntary manslaughter and of motor vehicle homicide, G.L. c. 90, § 24G(a), an offense that includes as an element a finding of driving while intoxicated. Following the procedure mandated by Commonwealth v. Jones, 382 Mass. 387, 392-395, 416 N.E.2d 502 (1981), the trial judge dismissed the charge of motor vehicle homicide as duplicative for double jeopardy purposes, and sentenced Stockman on the manslaughter conviction. Noting that a consequence of the Jones procedure was to leave standing only a conviction (i.e., manslaughter) that **612 on its face did not suggest the death was caused by Stockman's drunk driving, the judge, cognizant that drunk driving convictions are the predicate for license revocations under G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(c)(4), placed on the record the following notation:
"In imposing sentence on only the involuntary manslaughter conviction, this court did not mean to preclude any appropriate license suspension sanctions for a motor vehicle fatality. This court therefore states that any licence suspension sanctions that would result from a conviction [under] chapter 90, section 24G, [the] motor vehicle homicide statute, should apply to this defendant, who in fact was convicted [under] both the ... motor vehicle homicide statute and the involuntary manslaughter statute."
Upon receiving the court abstract, the registrar of motor vehicles suspended Stockman's license for ten years pursuant to § 24G(c). When the registrar later discovered Stockman's prior conviction of driving while intoxicated in 1990, the registrar, acting in accordance with his understanding of G.L. c. 90, § 24(1)(c)(4), revoked for life Stockman's license to operate. On appeal, the defendant board of appeal on motor vehicle liability policies and bonds (board) upheld the suspension, as did the judge who reviewed the board's decision under G.L. c. 30A, § 14. Both decisions are, in our view, correct.
Stockman's initial contention stems from the elusive wording of § 24(1)(c) (4), as amended through St.1982, c. 373, § 4, which instructs the registrar as follows:
"Notwithstanding the foregoing, no new license shall be *161 issued or right to operate be reinstated by the registrar to any person convicted of a violation of subparagraph (1) of paragraph (a) until ten years after the date of conviction in case the registrar determines upon investigation and after hearing that the action of the person so convicted in committing such offense caused an accident resulting in the death of another, nor at any time after a subsequent conviction of such an offense, whenever committed, in case the registrar determines in the manner aforesaid that the action of such person, in committing the offense of which he was so subsequently convicted, caused an accident resulting in the death of another" (emphasis added).
Stockman argues that the emphasized language requires, for a lifetime revocation, two separate accidents, each caused by the defendant's intoxicated driving, each resulting in a person's death. The correct reading, in our view, is that the words "subsequent conviction of such an offense" refer to a previous conviction of violating § 24(1)(a)(1), that is to say, of driving while intoxicated. For a ten-year revocation, § 24(1)(c)(4) only requires a conviction of driving while intoxicated, coupled with a determination by the registrar that the intoxicated driver caused a fatal accident. For a lifetime revocation, the language calls for two convic
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