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State v. Moss3/6/2000
The defendant, William H. Moss, was convicted pursuant to a guilty plea entered on March 17, 1998, in the Criminal Court for Anderson County of a Class A misdemeanor offense of DUI, third offense. For this conviction, he was sentenced to eleven months and twenty-nine days, to serve 120 days in the Anderson County Jail with the remaining portion of his sentence to be suspended. The defendant appeals as of right from an order entered by the Criminal Court for Anderson County on November 30, 1998, requiring that he be reincarcerated to serve the remainder of his 120-day jail sentence.
The defendant presents two issues for our review:
I. Whether reincarceration of defendant is fundamentally unfair; and
II. Whether the State of Tennessee is responsible for payment of defendant's medical bills while on furlough for an emergency appendectomy.
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
FACTS
The facts of this case are not in controversy. The defendant reported to the Anderson County Jail on April 17, 1998, to serve his 120-day sentence. Within approximately two weeks, he suffered a severe attack of appendicitis. The sheriff, without prior notice to the State, the defendant, or defense counsel, contacted a judge who granted a furlough based on a medical emergency. The only written record of the granting of a furlough was a notation attached to the jail docket. A guard accompanied the defendant to the hospital where, once the defendant's condition was diagnosed and the need for surgery determined, the guard left the hospital. The defendant successfully underwent an appendectomy and was released approximately one week later. The defendant was not contacted by anyone from the jail or any other official concerning the furlough or any particular date for his return to jail. The defendant went home, continued to recuperate, and started a new job.
Some months later, the defendant told his probation officer that he had served only twelve days of his 120-day sentence. The probation officer relayed this information to the prosecutor. Consequently, a hearing was held to determine the defendant's status. An order to serve sentence was issued by the trial court on November 30, 1998, requiring that the defendant be reincarcerated to serve the remaining days of his sentence. The trial court allowed credit for the seven days the defendant was hospitalized.
ANALYSIS
I. Due Process Violation
The defendant contends that reincarceration is a violation of his due process rights.
Tennessee Code Annotated § 40-35-302(b) articulates the basic principle that a defendant must be confined in prison for the term of the sentence. This principle is firmly rooted in the common law. In 1888, our supreme court held that a defendant was not entitled to credit for the time he was illegally discharged and that the "time elapsing until reimprisonment cannot be counted as time in prison." State ex rel. Johnston v. McClellan, 87 Tenn. 52, 9 S.W. 233, 234 (Tenn. 1888). As courts have dealt with this principle in practice, judicially created exceptions have developed that looked to the totality of the circumstances to determine whether reincarceration was fundamentally fair in specific cases. See Johnson v. Williford, 682 F.2d 868, 872 (9th Cir. 1982) ("Even convicted criminals are entitled to be treated by their government in a fair and straightforward manner."). The doctrines relied upon by the courts in reviewing reincarceration of prisoners include: (1) governmental waiver of the right to recommit; and (2) equitable estoppel.
A. Doctrine of Governmental Waiver
For the do
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