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Murchison v. State1/10/2000
Appellant Joseph Lee Murchison was charged by information with the offense of driving while intoxicated. Murchison filed a special plea in bar asserting collateral estoppel, and a motion to suppress based on the plea in bar. Both were heard and overruled by the trial court. Murchison then pled guilty, was found guilty, and received a plea bargained sentence of ninety days in jail, probated for twenty-four months and a fine of two hundred dollars. In this appeal, Murchison brings two points of error, both complaining of the trial court's action in overruling his motion to suppress. We affirm.
The motion to suppress was based entirely on the issue of collateral estoppel. Murchison separately asserted that the issue of reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop his vehicle, and the issue of probable cause to believe that he was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated, were both litigated before an administrative law judge. This litigation took place in a hearing pursuant to a petition from the Texas Department of Public Safety seeking to have the administrative law judge revoke Murchison's driver's license and suspend his driving privileges. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. § 524.001 - 524.051 (Vernon 1999 & Supp. 2000). Although the administrative law judge found in favor of the Texas Department of Public Safety, on appeal to the county court at law, the county court at law specifically found that there was no reasonable suspicion or probable cause to stop Murchison's vehicle or to arrest him, and no probable cause to believe that Murchison was operating a motor vehicle in a public place while intoxicated. In urging his motion to suppress to the trial court, Murchison introduced the final order of the county court at law. On appeal to this Court, Murchison maintains that the trial court erred in not granting his motion to suppress because the doctrine of collateral estoppel both barred relitigation of the issues addressed in his motion and called for the trial judge to apply the findings from the license revocation proceeding on those issues to his driving while intoxicated case.
One day after the conclusion of the proceedings in the trial court, the Court of Criminal Appeals decided this issue against the position taken by Murchison. See State v. Brabson, 976 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. Crim . App. 1998). See also Reynolds v. State, 4 S.W.3d 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). In Brabson, the Court of Criminal Appeals recognized that when an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and is resolving disputed issues of ultimate fact properly before it, those issues cannot again be litigated between the same parties in any future lawsuit. See Brabson, 976 S.W.2d at 183-84. The court then went on to hold that the Texas Department of Public Safety and the district attorney's office were not the same parties for the purposes of collateral estoppel. See id. at 184. The court further held that , for reasons stated in the opinion, the issue of probable cause to arrest is not properly before an administrative law judge in an administrative hearing to determine whether a driver's license should be revoked. See id. at 185. On these two holdings, the court concluded that a district attorney, when prosecuting an offense for driving while intoxicated, is not collaterally estopped from litigating the issue of probable cause to arrest even though the Texas Department of Public Safety received an adverse ruling on that issue in a prior administrative license revocation proceeding. See id. at 183, 185.
The issues in Brabson and the issues raised by Murchison are identical. Having noted that in Brabson these issues were resolved contrary to Murchison's assertions in both points
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