State v. Singer2/4/2000
January Term, 2000
Howard E. Van Benthuysen, J.
The State appeals from the district court's dismissal of the civil license suspension proceeding against defendant Eldon Singer. The court dismissed the matter because a final hearing could not be held within forty-two days of the date of the alleged offense, and the State had not shown good cause for the delay. See 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h). We affirm.
The relevant facts are not in dispute. On October 17, 1998, defendant was charged with driving while intoxicated (DWI), in violation of 23 V.S.A. § 1201. The police officer who charged defendant did not administer a breath test; rather, defendant was taken to Fletcher Allen Health Care, where a sample of his blood was obtained. On December 9, 1998, the officer delivered to defendant a notice of intent to suspend his driver's license. See id. § 1205(c). On December 11, 1998, defendant requested a hearing before the district court on the issue of license suspension. See id. § 1205(f).
The court held a preliminary hearing on December 24, 1998, see id. § 1205(g), at which time defendant asked the court to dismiss the civil suspension proceeding because a final hearing could not be held within forty-two days of the date of the alleged offense as required by statute. See id. § 1205(h). The State argued that the language of §1205(h) was directory, not mandatory, and that it had good cause for the delay in this case because defendant had been given a blood test. According to the State, a blood test is per-se good cause. The court disagreed, holding that the language of the statute was mandatory, and that the fact that the state was relying on a blood test, rather than a breath test, was not, in and of itself, good cause for the delay. The State appealed pursuant to 23 V.S.A. § 1205(k).
The State argues that the court erred in dismissing the civil suspension proceeding because (1) the above-quoted language of 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h) is directory, not mandatory, (2) a blood test is per-se good cause, and (3) the court did not give the State an opportunity to develop its argument that a blood test is per-se good cause. We address these arguments in order.
23 V.S.A. § 1205(h) states, in relevant part:
If the defendant requests a hearing on the merits, the court shall schedule a final hearing on the merits to be held within 21 days of the date of the preliminary hearing. In no event may a final hearing occur more than 42 days after the date of the alleged offense without the consent of the defendant or for good cause shown. The final hearing may only be continued by the consent of the defendant or for good cause shown.
According to the State, the statute does not specify a consequence for failure to comply with the forty-two-day time limit, and therefore, the statute is directory, not mandatory. We disagree.
As we have previously stated, " he determination of whether statutory language is mandatory or directory is one of legislative intent." In re Mullestein, 148 Vt. 170, 174, 531 A.2d 890, 892 (1987). In Mullestein, we held that a statutory time limit is directory when it "'directs the manner of doing a thing, and is not of the essence of the authority for doing it.'" Id. at 174, 531 A.2d at 892-93 (quoting Warner v. Mower, 11 Vt. 385, 394 (1839)). In other words, the language of a directory statute "relates to procedure." Id., 531 A.2d at 893. See also State v. Camolli, 156 Vt. 208, 214, 591 A.2d 53, 57 (1991) ("Where a statute's language is directory, compliance is not essential to a proceeding's validity."). On the other hand, a statutory time limit is mandatory only if it contains both an express requirement that an
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