State v. Singer2/4/2000
meet the statutory time limit.
Finally, it bears noting that, if the Legislature had intended for the forty-two-day time limit to be directory and not mandatory, it would not have included exceptions. Indeed, if the time limit were directory, the State would have no need to justify a delay by demonstrating that it had either the defendant's consent or good cause. Thus, if the time limit were directory, the statutory exceptions would be mere surplusage, a result we avoid in interpreting statutes. See State v. Hatcher, 167 Vt. 338, 343-44, 706 A.2d 429, 432 (1997) ("Defendant's construction of the statute would render the deliberation element of first-degree murder mere surplusage, a result which we have repeatedly cautioned against."); Vermont State Colleges Faculty Fed'n v. Vermont State Colleges, 138 Vt. 451, 455, 418 A.2d 34, 37 (1980) ("Presumably, this language was inserted advisedly, and with intent that it should be given meaning and force.").
Therefore, we conclude that the language of 23 V.S.A. § 1205(h) is mandatory: if a final hearing is not held within forty-two days of the date of the alleged offense, the civil license suspension proceeding must be dismissed unless the State demonstrates either that it had the defendant's consent or good cause for the delay. We next discuss whether, in this case, the State has demonstrated good cause.
The State argues that it had good cause for the delay because defendant was given a blood test rather than a breath test. According to the State, obtaining a blood test is per-se good cause. We disagree.
First, as the trial court noted, in enacting the civil license suspension statute, the Legislature did not distinguish between types of tests. As we noted in Camolli, "the statute speaks generally in terms of 'a test.'" Camolli, 156 Vt. at 212, 591 A.2d at 56 (quoting 23 V.S.A. § 1205(a)). Had the Legislature intended to distinguish between a blood test and a breath test for purposes of good cause, it would have included language to that effect. See id. at 213, 591 A.2d at 56.
Furthermore, whether good cause exists is a mixed question of fact and law. See, e.g., State v. Palmer, Vt. , , 740 A.2d 356, 358 (1999); State v. Ahearn, 137 Vt. 253, 263, 403 A.2d 696, 703 (1979). In some cases, difficulty in capturing or analyzing a blood test, for example, may provide good cause for a delay. Here, however, the State neither presented, nor attempted to present, any facts to support a finding of good cause other than simply stating that a blood test was involved. Therefore, the court did not err in concluding that the State failed to show good cause for the delay.
Finally, the State argues that the court erred, and the case should be remanded, because the court did not allow the State to develop its argument that there was good cause for a delay. However, an examination of the transcript reveals that the State had a sufficient opportunity to develop its argument at the hearing. There was no error.
Affirmed.
FOR THE COURT: Associate Justice
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