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Castro v. State4/8/1998
cers probable cause to arrest Castro.
Moreover, within minutes of the initial stop, Powell told the police that Castro had been driving the car. Castro argues that Powell's statement should be suppressed because, like Castro, Powell was handcuffed (and thus, according to Castro, illegally arrested) when he got out of the car. However, even if we assume that Powell was unlawfully handcuffed and that his statement was the fruit of that unlawful handcuffing, Castro has no standing to seek suppression of Powell's statement. Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights; they can only be asserted by the person whose rights were violated. Thus, even if Powell's statement was the fruit of a violation of his Fourth Amendment rights, only Powell would have the right to seek suppression of that statement, not Castro. Waring v. State, 670 P.2d 357, 361-63 (Alaska 1983); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223, 230; 93 S.Ct. 1565, 1570; 36 L.Ed.2d 208 (1973) ("Fourth Amendment rights are personal rights which ... may not be vicariously asserted").
Because we conclude that the information identifying Castro as the driver of the car did not stem from the police's decision to handcuff Castro, the officers' ultimate decision to arrest Castro was legal whether or not the officers were authorized to handcuff Castro when he first emerged from the car. See Cruse v. State, 584 P.2d 1141, 1145 (Alaska 1978) ("The exclusionary rule extends only to those facts which were actually discovered through a direct process initiated by the unlawful act."). Thus, both the information identifying Castro as the driver and the blood-alcohol reading obtained during Castro's subsequent breath test were admissible against him regardless of the legality of the handcuffing.
In a second point on appeal, Castro argues that the double jeopardy clause of the Alaska Constitution (Article I, Section 9) prohibited the State from prosecuting him for driving while intoxicated because the Department of Public Safety had already taken administrative action against his driver's license, based on his breath-test result in this case. We recently rejected this same claim in Aaron v. Ketchikan, 927 P.2d 335 (Alaska App. 1996). Aaron controls Castro's case.
The Bethel Case (File No. A-6086)
In the early morning of May 6, 1995, Bethel Police Officer Benjamin Dudley saw Castro's vehicle (a Ford Bronco) drive past clearly visible markers and start down a road that had been blocked off because it had been washed out by a flood. Dudley followed in his patrol car. When Dudley got behind the Bronco, he saw that it had no license plate. Dudley then stopped the vehicle. Even as he walked up to the Bronco, Dudley noticed an odor of alcoholic beverages emanating from the car. Dudley told Castro that he had stopped him for having no license plates, and he asked Castro to get out of the car. When Castro did so, Dudley noticed a strong odor of alcoholic beverages on Castro's person. Castro's eyes were bloodshot and watery, and he swayed distinctly from side to side. Dudley asked Castro if he had been drinking; Castro replied that he had had "a couple beers".
Although Dudley believed that he already had probable cause to arrest Castro for driving while intoxicated, he asked Castro to perform field sobriety tests; Castro agreed. Castro failed the horizontal gaze nystagmus test and the walk-and-turn test. According to the officer, Castro also could not complete the stand-on-one-leg test. Castro disputed this. He claimed that he refused to complete the stand-on-one-leg test: Dudley asked Castro to stand on one leg and count to 30, but Castro told the officer that he would stand on one leg only for a count of 9, since Dudl
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