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People v. Simpson6/11/1998
Appeal from the District Court of Pueblo County
Honorable Eugene T. Halaas, Judge
No. 96CR1211
SENTENCE AFFIRMED
Division IV
Defendant, Joseph E. Simpson, appeals the sentence imposed by the trial court following his guilty plea to first degree burglary. We affirm.
As a result of a plea agreement, defendant entered guilty pleas in five separate cases in two divisions of the district court. In the instant case, defendant was sentenced to six years probation, to be served concurrently with a six-month term earlier imposed by another Judge for defendant's guilty plea to driving under the influence of alcohol.
As a condition of probation, the trial court ordered that defendant serve two years in a work release program through the Pueblo County Jail. Defense counsel objected on the grounds that defendant was not then currently employed. In response, the court granted defendant "furloughs to seek employment on a reasonable basis."
Following his incarceration, defendant filed a motion for a furlough to seek employment, which was granted by the trial court. However, a similar request to the Judge who had imposed the DUI sentence was denied. Subsequent requests were similarly ineffective, with the result that defendant did not participate in conventional employment prior to initiating this appeal.
I.
Defendant first contends that the trial court erred by sentencing him to two years in a work release program. More specifically, defendant contends that because he was not employed, not capable of seeking employment, and not enrolled in school at the time of sentencing, the court was statutorily limited to imposing no more than a 90-day jail term as a condition of probation. We disagree.
Defendant's claim involves a consideration of two statutory sentencing provisions. Section 16-11-202, C.R.S. 1997, provides, in pertinent part:
In addition to imposing other conditions, the court has the power to commit the defendant to any jail operated by the county or city and county in which the offense was committed during such time or for such intervals within the period of probation as the court determines. The aggregate length of any such commitment . . . shall not exceed ninety days for a felony, sixty days for a misdemeanor, or ten days for a petty offense unless it is a part of a work release program pursuant to section 16-11-212.
However, Section 16-11-212, C.R.S. 1997, which authorizes a work release program as a condition of probation, states that:
he court may require the probationer to participate for a period not to exceed two years or the term to which he might be sentenced for the offense committed, whichever is less, in a supervised work release or education release program. Utilization of the county jail, a municipal jail, or any other facility may be used for the probationer's full-time confinement, care, and maintenance, except for the time he is released for scheduled work or education.
It is defendant's position that these statutes reflect the General Assembly's determination that the therapeutic benefits of a traditional jail sentence as a condition of probation cannot justify a sentence beyond ninety days, unless the jail sentence is part of a work release program.
He further contends that the statutory work release program contemplated by the General Assembly is limited to one of compensated employment or education. Therefore, because he was unable to do either, he argues that the court was limited to imposing the ninety-day jail term contemplated in Section 16-11-202.
In resol
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