 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
People v. Simpson6/11/1998
ving questions of statutory interpretation, we must ascertain and give effect to the intent of the General Assembly. In determining that intent, we first look to the plain language of the statute, People v. District Court, 713 P.2d 918 (Colo. 1986), as well as the problem addressed by the legislation and the statutory remedy created to cure the problem. Charnes v. Boom, 766 P.2d 665 (Colo. 1988). In this context, we note that statutes governing the same subject must be reconciled, if possible. People v. Santisteven, 868 P.2d 415 (Colo. App. 1993). Finally, the statutory scheme must be read and considered as a whole to give consistent, harmonious, and sensible effect to all its parts. Charnes v. Boom, supra.
Construing the language of the statutes at issue in its entirety, we find no support for a Conclusion that imposition of a two-year jail term as part of a work release program is contingent upon an offender's then having compensated employment or being enrolled in educational courses at the time of sentencing. This construction would deprive certain defendants of the rehabilitative benefits of participation in a work release program. And, had the General Assembly intended to place these limits on the court's authority, it could have done so. Instead, the court's authority to impose such a sentence as a part of a work release program is not restrained or limited in any way.
Therefore, we conclude that the sentencing court did not exceed its authority in imposing the two-year jail term as a condition of defendant's probation.
II.
Defendant further contends that the trial court erred by imposing a sentence that was impossible for him to comply with because he was unable to leave the jail to participate in a work release program. We again disagree.
Defendant fails to recognize that it was not the sentence here being appealed that prevented him from participating in a traditional work release program. Rather, defendant remained confined to jail because he was serving a separate, six-month DUI sentence. Therefore, his confinement is attributable to the DUI sentence and is not an improper result of his work release sentence.
When defendant's DUI sentence is complete, defendant may again petition the court for work-seeking furloughs. Also at that time, defendant's two-year period of work release will have been shortened by the amount of time served for the DUI conviction.
The sentence is affirmed.
JUDGE CASEBOLT and JUDGE ROY concur.
|