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Janes v. State6/26/1998
Collateral estoppel: State not estopped from prosecuting defendant for driving while intoxicated because of finding by ALJ in license suspension proceeding that defendant was not driving.
The issue before us is collateral estoppel - whether the State is precluded from prosecuting appellant, Vincent Janes, for driving while intoxicated and other related offenses because, in an earlier proceeding before the Motor Vehicle Administration (MVA), conducted to determine whether Janes's driver's license should be suspended by reason of his refusal to take a breath test, an administrative law judge determined that Janes was not driving the vehicle. We shall hold that the State is not precluded from proceeding with the criminal case.
RELEVANT STATUTORY FRAMEWORK
There are three principal statutes bearing on Maryland's effort to keep drunk and drugged drivers off the State's roads, each being codified in the Transportation Article of the Maryland Code (1998 Repl. Vol.). The first - 21-902 - prohibits a person from driving or attempting to drive (1) while intoxicated ( 21-902(a)(1)), (2) while intoxicated per se ( 21-902(a)(2)), (3) while under the influence of alcohol ( 21-902(b)), (4) while so far under the influence of any drug, any combination of drugs, or a combination of a drug or drugs and alcohol that the person cannot drive a vehicle safely ( 21-902(c)), or (5) while under the influence of a controlled dangerous substance ( 21-902(d)). A violation of any of those provisions is a misdemeanor punishable by fine and imprisonment, the severity of the punishment depending on the offense and whether the person is a repeat offender. See 27-101.
The second statute is 16-205, which permits, but does not require, MVA to revoke or to suspend for varying periods the driver's license of a person convicted of an offense under 21-902. Revocation is allowed for the more serious offenses - those under 21-902 (a) or (d) - and for a conviction under 21-902 (b) or (c) if, within the three years preceding the conviction, the person had been convicted of any combination of two or more violations of 21-902. Otherwise, suspension for up to 60 days is allowed for a first conviction, and of up to 120 days for a second conviction. A revocation or suspension under 16-205 can occur only after a criminal conviction; it is a collateral, civil consequence of the conviction.
The third statute is 16-205.1, which provides for the suspension of a person's driver's license for either (1) refusing to take a test for the presence of alcohol or drugs upon request of a police officer having reasonable grounds to believe that the person has committed an offense under 21-902, or (2) for taking a test that reveals an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more. This is the statute principally at issue here. Unlike 16-205, it is not tied to a criminal conviction but operates independently of both 21-902 (and 27-101) and 16-205. An appreciation of the collateral estoppel argument made by appellant requires a deeper analysis of 16-205.1.
The precursor of 16-205.1 was first enacted in 1969, by 1969 Md. Laws, ch. 158. Under that law, each applicant for the issuance or renewal of a driver's license had to sign a statement under oath or affirmation consenting (1) to take a chemical test to determine the alcoholic content of his or her blood, breath, or urine if detained upon suspicion of driving while intoxicated or impaired by alcohol, and (2) to having his or her driver's license suspended for up to 60 days for refusing to take the test. If the person, upon being detained by an officer upon reasonable suspicion that the person was driving while intoxicated or impaired, refused to take the test
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