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State v. Bodden4/15/2004
ut not for urine testing violates his rights under the equal protection clauses of both the federal and state constitutions. Persons charged with DUI are not a protected or suspect class under the equal protection clauses. See Graham v. Ramani, 383 So.2d 634, 635 (Fla.1980) (holding that suspect classes are those based on alienage, nationality, or race). In the absence of a suspect classification, equal protection demands only that a classification that results in unequal treatment bear some rational relationship to a legitimate state purpose. See Duncan v. Moore, 754 So.2d 708, 712 (Fla.2000). Therefore, the State may treat those charged with DUI based on blood and breath evidence of alcohol differently from those charged because of urine test results, so long as there is a rational basis for doing so.
In this regard, we note that the goals of the breath and blood tests are different from the goals of urine testing. Breath and blood tests detect alcohol content, whereas urine tests detect controlled substances. See § 316.1932(1)(a)(1). If an individual has a certain level of alcohol in his or her system, the State benefits from the presumption of impairment. See § 316.1934. However, because there is no "legal limit" for controlled substances, there is no similar presumption associated with urine test results. A person is guilty of DUI only if the State proves that the controlled substance impaired the person's normal faculties.
We note that the testimony of the FDLE expert in this case further demonstrates the specific purpose and distinct nature of the urine test. According to the expert, unlike a breath or blood test which determines alcohol content, a level of impairment cannot be extrapolated from a drug concentration detected in a urine sample. In other words, it would be very difficult to conclude that a person was under the influence of a particular drug to the point that his or her normal faculties were impaired at the time of his or her arrest based solely on the presence of the drug in the person's urine.
Moreover, as even the Second District noted in Bodden, "the methodology for administering a urine test should be somewhat less complex than the methodology necessary for administering a breath or blood test." 872 So.2d 918. The Fifth District similarly stated in Pierre that "[t]he legislature apparently concluded that its own basic guidelines were sufficient for this rather simple test, but that more comprehensive procedures should be developed for blood testing, which is more intrusive, and breath testing, which is more complex, than urine testing." 854 So.2d at 233. Based on these distinctions, we conclude that a rational basis exists for treating the procedures for administering urine tests differently from the procedures for administering breath and blood tests and therefore reject Bodden's argument that the statute violates equal protection.
CONCLUSION
In conclusion, we hold that the implied consent law for operators of motor vehicles does not require that urine testing methods be approved in accordance with the APA. We emphasize that we do not decide whether it would be preferable for urine tests to be approved through rule promulgation. *690 Rather, we resolve this case by applying well-established principles of statutory construction to effectuate the legislative intent of the statute. See Hawkins v. Ford Motor Co., 748 So.2d 993, 1000 (Fla.1999). Accordingly, we approve the Fourth and Fifth Districts' reasoning in Montello and Pierre, answer the certified question in Bodden in the negative, and quash the Second District's decision below. We remand this case for proceedings consistent with this opinion.
It is so ordered.
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