 |
 |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|
|
|
|
State v. Ingraham6/23/1998
art that the work product doctrine did not apply to conversations Ingraham had with Windham in the aftermath of the accident. In so concluding, the court reasoned that
he logical extension of this argument would be that no statements of attorney-parties to litigation would ever be admissible. There was never any indication that the Defendant was representing himself in connection with this matter. In fact, in support of his argument concerning the attorney-client privilege, Defendant contends that the relationship was established between himself, as client, and his father, as attorney, within minutes after the motor vehicle collision that led to these charges. There is no support for the proposition that the information shared by Defendant with his employees should be excluded under the work product doctrine.
Having reviewed the record, we agree with the District Court's conclusion on this issue and, absent an abuse of discretion, we will not disturb its decision to admit Windham's testimony.
C. Rebuttal testimony
Finally, Ingraham argues Windham's testimony on rebuttal was improper. Ingraham notes that, on rebuttal, Windham testified as "to what she heard Mr. Ingraham say when he described the accident to other persons, when his father was not present." Ingraham asserts that, although the court agreed the testimony did not constitute proper rebuttal, it nevertheless allowed that testimony. For the court to do so, Ingraham argues, was an abuse of discretion.
Contrary to Ingraham's assertion, the court, in fact, concluded that Windham's testimony was appropriate rebuttal, even though it did not directly refute Ingraham's version of his conversation with Windham on the date of the collision. Having reviewed the record, we hold the District Court did not abuse its discretion in so concluding, and in allowing Windham's testimony on rebuttal.
ISSUE 11
Did the District Court err in ordering the parties not to contact the jurors after they rendered their verdict?
Ingraham's counsel asserts that, following the verdict in this case, he learned of the possibility "that the jury may have received extraneous prejudicial information, resulting from a highly prejudicial conversation in a juror's presence." On August 16, 1996, Ingraham filed a motion for a new trial, on the grounds of alleged juror misconduct. On October 9, 1996, the District Court ordered that counsel refrain from contacting the jurors in this case. Ingraham filed a second motion for a new trial on October 24, 1996, and additionally asked that the court lift its "order prohibiting counsel from speaking with trial jurors." On December 31, 1996, the District Court issued its findings of fact, conclusions of law, and order denying Ingraham's motions for a new trial. On appeal, Ingraham argues the court was without authority to "issue a blanket order precluding attempted contact with nonparty witnesses," and asserts the court's order that he not contact the jurors prevented a full investigation into allegations of juror misconduct.
In light of our determination that Ingraham is entitled to a new trial with respect to the charges of negligent homicide and criminal endangerment on other grounds, we need not reach the merits of this issue.
ISSUE 12
Did the District Court commit prejudicial cumulative error, thereby entitling Ingraham to a new trial?
We need not address the question of whether Ingraham is entitled a new trial pursuant to the cumulative error doctrine in light of our conclusion that the District Court committed reversible error in admitting evidence of the medications detected i
Page 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 Montana DUI Attorneys
DUI Lawyers
|
| |
to fill out a simple form to connect to DUI Lawyers in your area.
|
|