Woods v. State5/19/1998
ict court adopted the presentence report and the State's sentencing recommendation of two fifteen-year consecutive sentences; the district court also assessed a fine of $2,000 on each of the two counts.
Woods now appeals from his judgment of conviction arguing that the district court erred in denying his motions to withdraw and set aside the plea agreement. He argues that his plea was not voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered, and that the plea agreement was unlawful pursuant to NRS 484.3795(2). He further asserts that the district court erred by imposing consecutive sentences based upon a single act.
Discussion
The district court did not err in denying Woods, motion to withdraw his plea.
NRS 176.165 provides:
Except as otherwise provided in this section, a motion to withdraw a plea of guilty . . . may be made only before sentence is imposed or imposition of sentence is suspended. To correct manifest inJustice, the court after sentence may set aside the judgment of conviction and permit the defendant to withdraw his plea.
A district court may, in its discretion, grant a defendant's motion to withdraw a guilty plea for any "substantial reason" if it is "fair and just. State v. District Court, 85 Nev. 361, 385, 455 P.2d 923, 926 (1969). Woods concedes that the canvass was "textbook" perfect, and we defer to the district court Judge who concluded that Woods' reactions were not "robot-like"; however, this court has held that the district court must also look to the totality of the circumstances and the entire record. Mitchell v. State, 109 Nev. 137, 140-41, 848 P.2d 1060, 1061-62 (1993).
In Mitchell, we concluded that, "viewing the record as a whole, especially in light of appellant's credible claim of factual innocence and the lack of prejudice to the state," the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion to withdraw appellant's guilty plea. 109 Nev. at 141, 848 P.2d at 1062. In the instant case, Woods did not assert a "credible claim of factual innocence" and, as evidenced by the transcript of the December 3, 1996 hearing on Woods' motion, the district court properly considered the totality of the circumstances and the entire record. Viewing the record as a whole, we conclude that Woods voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently entered the plea agreement.
Woods' reliance on Hanley v. State, 97 Nev. 130, 624 P.2d 1387 (1981), and Smith v. State, 110 Nev. 1009, 1014, 879 P. 2d 60, 63 (1994), is misplaced. Woods cites Hanley for the proposition that a defendant must be personally addressed regarding his knowledge of the elements of the crime and defense counsel's "'word' that the elements of the criminal offense had been dutifully explained" will not suffice. Id. at 135 n.3, 624 P.2d 1390 n.3. This court has replaced Hanley's formally structured analysis of the plea canvass with a review of the record as a whole to ensure, inter alia, that a defendant understood the true nature of the charge against him. Dressler v. State, 107 Nev. 686, 696 n.6, 819 P.2d 1288, 1194-95 n.6; Bryant v. State, 102 Nev. 268, 273, 72-1- P.2d 364, 367 (1986). Having reviewed the canvass and the plea memorandum, it is clear that the district court personally engaged Woods regarding the elements of the offenses with which he was charged.
In Smith, we addressed a situation where the plea memorandum was "completely inconsistent with the court's canvass." Smith, 110 Nev. at 1014, 879 P.2d at 63. Here the parties have admitted that the canvass was not deficient and there was no discrepancy between the canvass and the written plea memorandum. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in de
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