State v. Lomas4/2/1998
Ct. at 493 (quoting United States ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537, 549 (1943) and quoting Moore v. Illinois, 14 How. 13, 19 (1852))). Rather, " he Clause protects only against the imposition of multiple criminal punishments for the same offense." Id. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 493.
In its recent Hudson decision, the Supreme Court in large part disavowed the double jeopardy analysis announced in United States v. Halper, 490 U.S. 435 (1989). The district court in the instant case applied the Halper analysis in resolving Lomas' double jeopardy claim. Under the analysis defined in Hudson, the district court's order dismissing the criminal charges against Lomas on double jeopardy grounds must be reversed.
Based on a previously established rule exemplified in United States v. Ward, 448 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1980), Hudson articulates a two-part test for determining whether a particular punishment is criminal or civil. First, " court must . . . ask whether the legislature, 'in establishing the penalizing mechanism, indicated either expressly or impliedly a preference for one label or the other.'" Hudson, ___ U.S. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 493 (quoting Ward, 448 U.S. at 248). Second, even in those cases where the legislature indicates an intention to establish a civil penalty, a court should inquire further whether the statutory scheme is so punitive either in purpose or effect, "as to `transfor what was clearly intended as a civil remedy into a criminal penalty.'" Id. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 493 (quoting Rex Trailer Co. v. United States, 350 U.S. 148, 154 (1956)).
In making this latter determination, the Hudson Court looked to seven factors listed in Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 168-69 (1963), as "useful guideposts." Hudson, U.S. at 118 S. Ct. at 493. These factors include: (1) whether the sanction involves an affirmative disability or restraint; (2) whether it has historically been regarded as a punishment; (3) whether it comes into play only on a finding of scienter; (4) whether its operation will promote the traditional aims of punishment-retribution and deterrence; (5) whether the behavior to which it applies is already a crime; (6) whether an alternative purpose to which it may rationally be connected is assignable for it; and (7) whether it appears excessive in relation to the alternative purpose assigned. Id. at ___ 118 S. Ct. at 493. Hudson emphasizes that these factors must be considered "in relation to the statute on its face," and "only the clearest proof will suffice to override legislative intent and transform what has been denominated a civil remedy into a criminal penalty. " Id. at ___ 118 S. Ct. at 493 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted).
Turning then to the first step of the Hudson analysis, our prior holdings make it clear that the Nevada legislature intended driver's license revocation proceedings to be civil rather than criminal. We have previously concluded, for example, that an administrative driver's license revocation proceeding is "civil in nature, not criminal. State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles v. Frangul, 110 Nev. 46, 50, 867 P.2d 397, 399 (1994) ; see also State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles v. Binder, 109 Nev. 945, 949, 860 P. 2d 163, 166 (1993) ; Beavers v. State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles, 109 Nev. 435, 438, 851 P.2d 432, 434 (1993); State, Dep't of Mtr. Vehicles v. McLeod, 106 Nev. 852, 854, 801 P.2d 1390, 1392 (1990) ; Yohey v. State, Dep't Motor Vehicles, 103 Nev. 584, 587-88, 747 P.2d 238, 240 (1987) Moreover, as the Court noted in Hudson, the legislature's decision to confer authority to impose a civil sanction on an administrative agency is prima facie evidence that the legislature intended to provide for a civil sanction. Hudson, U.S.
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