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State v. Lomas4/2/1998
at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 495. Therefore, it is clear that the Nevada legislature intended administrative proceedings relating to revocation of a driver's license to be civil, not criminal.
With respect to the second part of the Hudson test, we conclude that there is little evidence, much less the "clearest proof," that driver's license revocation is so punitive in form and effect as to render it criminal despite the legislature's contrary intent. We note, for example, that the "revocation of a privilege voluntarily granted," such as the privilege to drive, is a sanction "characteristically free of the punitive criminal element." Hudson, U.S. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 496 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted). The revocation also does not involve an "affirmative disability or restraint," as that term was evidently understood in Hudson. Hudson observed, for example, that the civil sanction at issue in that case, imposition of a fine and the loss of the privilege to participate in the banking industry, was "'certainly nothing approaching the "infamous punishment" of imprisonment."' Hudson, U.S. at ____ , 118 S. Ct. at 496 (quoting Flemming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 617 (1960)). If occupational debarment from the banking industry cannot be considered an affirmative disability or restraint, then quite obviously the temporary suspension of respondent's driving privilege also cannot be so considered.
With respect to the remaining guideposts listed in Hudson, we note that an administrative driver's license revocation does not require a finding of scienter. Revocation can be imposed without inquiry into the violator's state of mind. Further, although the conduct for which the revocation is imposed can also be criminal , this fact is insufficient to render the sanction criminally punitive in the double jeopardy context. id. at ___, 118 S. Ct. at 496 (citing United States v. Ursery, 518 U.S. 267 (1996); United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688 (1993)).
Next, we conclude that driver's license revocation is rationally connected to a purpose other than criminal punishment. Specifically, revocation furthers the government's goal of maintaining safety on public roads. Moreover, a minimum ninety-day suspension is not excessive in relation to that goal. The state's interest in removing drunk drivers from the roads is "of such a nature and importance to society in general that the inconvenience occasioned by the temporary suspension of driving privileges pales by comparison." City of Columbus v. Adams, 461 N.E.2d 887, 890 (Ohio 1984), overruled on other grounds by State v. Williams, 667 N.E.2d 932 (Ohio 1996); see also Jones, 666 A.2d at 141.
Finally, the revocation statutes may deter drivers who entertain the idea of driving while intoxicated and may also discourage drivers whose licenses have been revoked from engaging in similar misconduct in the future. Although deterrence is a traditional goal of criminal punishment, the mere presence of a deterrent purpose is insufficient to render a sanction criminal for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause because deterrence also may serve civil goals. Hudson, U.S. at ___ 118 S. Ct. at 496.
The license revocation statutes at issue do not appear on their face to be punitive rather than remedial. On the contrary, by suspending the licenses of drivers who pose a danger to their own safety and to that of others, the statutes reveal a rational remedial, or civil deterrent purpose, rather than a retributive or criminal purpose.
Conclusion
Today, we adopt the double jeopardy analysis articulated in Hudson. To whatever extent that Hudson may effect a change in existing law, we conclude that the change is applicabl
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