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State v. Cham6/1/2004
s, 392 N.W.2d 224, 235 (Minn.1986). Here, there was a delay of 23 months from the date of arrest until the district court dismissed the charges. A delay of this length creates the presumption that Cham's right to a speedy trial was violated and triggers further inquiry. See State v. Corarito, 268 N.W.2d 79, 80 (Minn.1978) (concluding that delay of six months is sufficient to trigger further inquiry in the speedy trial analysis).
2. The reason for delay
We next consider the reasons for the delay. Barker, 407 U.S. at 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192. Barker places the primary burden of ensuring a speedy trial on the state and the court and recognizes that different weights will be assigned to different reasons for delay. Id. at 529, 531, 92 S.Ct. at 2192, 2191. In this case, administrative difficulties at the district court caused one continuance. But the on-going problem of obtaining an interpreter for Cham caused the majority of the delay. This delay had nothing to do with the district court administrator's effort to locate an interpreter, and the state was in no way responsible for the delay. Under these circumstances, despite the unusually long delay, and because the prosecution did not act in bad faith to delay the proceeding, the reason for delay weighs in favor of the state. See State v. Sap, 408 N.W.2d 638, 640 (Minn.App.1987) (under similar facts, denying appellant's claim that he was denied a speedy trial).
3. Whether and when the defendant asserted his right to a speedy trial
Cham never moved for a speedy trial, but he twice moved to dismiss the case based on violation of his right to a speedy trial. When a defendant moves for dismissal, but does not move for a speedy trial, this factor will not favor the defendant. See e.g., Sap, 408 N.W.2d at 640 (concluding that Sap's failure to move for a speedy trial, but instead for a dismissal, did not favor Sap in the speedy trial analysis).
4. The prejudice to the defendant caused by the delay
We consider three factors in determining if a defendant was prejudiced by the delay: "(1) preventing oppressive pretrial incarceration; (2) minimizing the anxiety and concern of the accused; and (3) preventing the possibility that the defense will be impaired." Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318. Cham asserts that he suffered prejudice because he was incarcerated for the DUI charge that was eventually dismissed for lack of probable cause, he suffered anxiety by having to appear again and again for a trial that never happened, and he knew that the alleged victim had recanted her testimony and therefore that the testimony was of doubtful admissibility. Only the claim that he experienced anxiety as a result of the delay supports Cham's claim of prejudice. See Windish, 590 N.W.2d at 318 (stating that minimizing the anxiety of the accused is a factor in determining whether the defendant was prejudiced by the delay). This prong of the speedy-trial analysis thus weighs in Cham's favor, if only slightly.
In conclusion, after applying the Barker test de novo to these facts, we conclude that the dismissal of the charges against Cham based on a violation of his right to a speedy trial was error. We reverse the *126 determination of the district court and remand with instructions to reinstate the complaint against Cham and to conduct proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion. [FN1]
FN1. Because we conclude that Cham was not denied his right to a speedy trial, and reverse the determination of the district court on this ground, we do not reach the state's other challenges to the district court's dismissal of the charges against Cham, specifically: that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the charges against Cham
based on the court's inability to secure interpreters for witnesses
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