Baer v. Commonwealth6/17/1998
, we note that the elements of a cause of action in negligence are: (1) a duty, recognized by law, requiring the actor to conform to a certain standard with respect to the injured party; (2) a failure of the actor to conform to that standard; (3) a causal connection between the conduct and the resulting injury; and (4) actual loss or damage to the interests of another. Talarico v. Bonham, 650 A.2d 1192 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Absent a legal duty owed to the injured party, no cause of action can lie against a Commonwealth party. Sloneker v. Martin, 604 A.2d 751(Pa. Cmwlth. 1991).
Our supreme court has recognized that DOT owes a legal duty to those using its real estate to ensure "that the condition of the property is safe for the activities for which it is regularly used, intended to be used or reasonably foreseen to be used." Snyder v. Harmon, 522 Pa. 424, 435, 562 A.2d 307, 312 (1989). See also Bendas v. Township of White Deer, 531 Pa. 180, 611 A.2d 1184 (1992). Because of this general duty, in certain instances, the common law imposes an additional duty on a government party to reduce risks posed by steep cliffs and embankments in close proximity to the highway by erecting guiderails or other barriers. Balla v. Sladek, 381 Pa. 85, 112 A.2d 156 (1955). However, there is a corresponding duty on all motorists to use the highways in the ordinary and usual manner and with reasonable care, Glover v. Department of Transportation, 647 A.2d 630 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994), appeal denied, 540 Pa. 606, 655 A.2d 994 (1995), and where an accident is the result of a motorist's failure to use the highway in such a manner, there can be no liability against DOT. Id.
Here, there is no dispute that the vehicle crossed the highway and left the road because of a loss of brakes, intoxication of the driver, or a combination of these factors. Under such circumstances, and even in circumstances which are less extreme, we have held that the resulting accident was too remote for DOT to have anticipated; thus, DOT had no duty to institute preventive measures. See Felli; Saylor v. Green, 645 A.2d 318 (Pa. Cmwlth. 1994). Based on this analysis and these cases,we affirm the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor of DOT, holding that Appellants failed to state a common law cause of action in negligence against DOT and, thus, did not meet the first prerequisite under the Act.
Appellants also contend that the trial court's grant of DOT's summary judgment motion was premature because discovery was not concluded. In seeking further discovery, Appellants hoped to obtain additional evidence to support their argument that defective highway design was a contributing cause of the accident and resulting injuries. However, we have already determined that DOT was entitled to summary judgment because it owed no duty to protect against the type of accident that occurred here. Because this determination, based on a lack of duty, would be unaffected by any additional information regarding causation, we need not consider Appellants' additional argument.
Accordingly, for the foregoing reasons, we affirm the order of the trial court granting DOT's motion for summary judgment.
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Judge
ORDER
AND NOW, this 17th day of June, 1998, the order of the Court of Common Pleas of Somerset County, dated March 4, 1997, is hereby affirmed.
ROCHELLE S. FRIEDMAN, Judge
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