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State v. Johnson5/4/2004
Johnson also argues that the letter from Officer Schmatz does not establish that the violations were intentional and inexcusable as required for revocation. It appears that Johnson had two years to attend the M.A.D.D. program. Due to delays in the revocation proceeding, he also had several months and three probation revocation hearings in the matter to introduce evidence explaining his failure to participate. In situations where there is a simple directive to participate in a program within a reasonable timeframe and evidence that the person ordered to so participate has failed to do so, the lack of an excuse can be inferred from the evidence. Johnson could easily have provided such rebuttal evidence either by his own testimony or through the testimony of another. We reject Johnson's claim that the inexcusable nature of the violation was not established or that the lack of confrontation so denied him the opportunity to rebut any implication as to prejudice him.
II.
The second issue is whether the district court erred in accepting the testimony of Officer Zawacki regarding Johnson's consumption of alcohol and Johnson's admission that he had been drinking. Johnson claims that Officer Zawacki's testimony on these two matters was not admissible because the Mille Lacs County District Court determined there was no articulable suspicion for Officer Zawacki to stop Johnson and that all evidence obtained as a result of the illegal stop should be suppressed pursuant to Minn.Stat. § 626.21 (2002).
When this court reviews district court evidentiary rulings, the district court is granted significant discretion and the question is limited to whether the district court clearly and unequivocally erred in its evidentiary judgment. State v. Aubid, 591 N.W.2d 472, 478 (Minn.1999). Whether a statute has been properly construed is a question of law subject to de novo review. State v. Murphy, 545 N.W.2d 909, 914 (Minn.1996).
The United States Supreme Court in Pa. Bd. of Prob. & Parole v. Scott, 524 U.S. 357, 118 S.Ct. 2014, 141 L.Ed.2d 344 (1998) held that the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule on illegal search and seizures was inapplicable to parole violation proceedings and that the government's use of evidence obtained in illegal search and seizures does not, in itself, violate the Constitution. *176 Id. at 362, 118 S.Ct. 2014. The Court balanced the costs of excluding reliable, probative evidence in parole revocation proceedings versus the benefits of deterring illegal search and seizures. Scott, 524 U.S. at 363, 118 S.Ct. at 2019. Illegally seized evidence would be barred only in the context where such benefits outweigh the costs. Id.
This court adopted the Scott rationale and applied it to probation revocation proceedings in State v. Martin, 595 N.W.2d 214 (Minn.App.1999), review denied (Minn. Aug. 25, 1999). In Martin, this court both held that there was no material distinction between the parole and probation systems and that there was no deterrence of illegal search and seizures unless officers somehow knew they were arresting people on probation. Id. at 216-17, 219.
However, the Minnesota legislature went beyond any constitutionally required exclusionary rule by enacting the following statute:
A person aggrieved by an unlawful search and seizure may move the district court ... for the return of the property and to suppress the use, as evidence, of anything so obtained on the ground that (1) the property was illegally seized.... If the motion is granted the property shall be restored ... and it shall not be admissible in evidence at any hearing or trial....
Minn.Stat. § 626.21. Johnson argues that the statute is not limited to "property ... illegally seized" but that it includes "anything so obtained," and that Officer Zawa
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