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State v. Bruno.4/9/1998
e hearing that the law enforcement officer making the sworn report had reasonable grounds to believe that the arrested person had been driving a motor vehicle within this state while under the influence of intoxicating liquor, * * * and [the administrative judge further finds] that the person while under arrest refused to submit to [a breathalyzer test] upon the request of a law enforcement officer, that the person had been informed of his or her rights in accordance with § 31-27-3, and that the person had been informed of the penalties incurred as a result of noncompliance with this section, the administrative Judge shall sustain the violation."
(Emphases added.)
"Under the language of the statute it is clear that reasonable suspicion is the proper standard for evaluating the lawfulness of a stop." State v. Jenkins, 673 A.2d 1094, 1097 (R.I. 1996). In Jenkins this Court observed that reasonable suspicion must be "based upon specific and articulable facts" from which reasonable inferences could be drawn. Id. Moreover, we found that the reasonable suspicion requirement of § 31-27-2.1 was satisfied where a police officer
"noticed [the motorist's] vehicle twice drift over the center line of the highway upon which she was traveling. Both times her vehicle's left wheels contacted the chatterstrip. The officer also saw [the motorist's] vehicle undertake wide turns while both entering and exiting a parking lot." 673 A.2d at 1097.
We conclude that the AAC hearing Judge and the appeals panel violated the clear mandate of § 31-27-2.1(b) to sustain a refusal violation when it has been found that reasonable suspicion existed to justify the stop. Even though respondent's claim that his erratic driving and other conduct were the results of medication and not of alcohol consumption might be relevant, for example, to a charge of driving under the influence , such a claim is not, as the hearing Judge and the appeals panel erroneously surmised, dispositive of whether reasonable suspicion existed to support a finding of a violation of § 31-27-2.1. Cf. Jenkins, 673 A.2d at 1097 (holding that a finding of not guilty in respect to a charge of driving under the influence has no bearing on whether the same motorist is guilty of refusing to submit to a breathalyzer test, since two separate statutes, "each having distinct elements," are involved). It is difficult to conceive of a fact pattern that would present a more solid case for reasonable suspicion under § 31-27-2.1 than the one before us.
The hearing Judge here in fact found that the officer had "perfectly good suspicion" to carry out the stop. It is uncontroverted that respondent was informed of his rights and of the penalties for refusing to take the breathalyzer test. Therefore, the Judge was clearly wrong in not sustaining the violation, as was the appeals panel in affirming the dismissal. Consequently we grant the state's petition for certiorari, quash the judgment of the AAC appeals panel, and remand the case to the appeals panel with directions to remand the matter to the hearing Judge to affirm the violation.
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