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State v. Anderson4/27/1998
Karen Angelini
Delivered and Filed:
REVERSED AND REMANDED
The State appeals the trial court's order granting a pre-trial motion to suppress all evidence seized and all statements made after appellee, Jack W. Anderson, was arrested for DWI. The trial court granted the motion to suppress because, at a prior administrative license revocation (ALR) hearing, the administrative law Judge (ALJ) held that there was no probable cause to arrest Anderson for driving while intoxicated (DWI). In one point of error, the State argues that the trial court erred when it granted the motion to suppress because the doctrine of collateral estoppel is not applicable to issues decided in ALR hearings.
Factual and Procedural Background
On June 16, 1996, Anderson was arrested for DWI. Consequently, Anderson was charged with misdemeanor DWI. In addition to the criminal charges, Anderson was also subject to having his driver's license suspended under section 724.035(a)(1) of the Texas Transportation Code for refusing to provide a breath specimen. At the license suspension hearing, the ALJ found that the Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS) had failed to prove that probable cause existed to arrest Anderson for DWI.
Anderson subsequently filed a motion to suppress in County Court at Law No. 2, the trial court that was to hear his DWI case. Anderson based his motion to suppress on lack of probable cause to arrest and argued that the State was collaterally estopped from litigating probable cause because the issue had been previously decided by the ALJ. The trial court granted the motion to suppress. It is this order that the State appeals. See Tex. Code Crim. P. Ann. art. 44.01(a)(5) (Vernon Supp. 1998) (stating that State can appeal order granting motion to suppress).
Standard Of Review
When we review a trial court's ruling, our standard of review is determined by which judicial actor is in a better position to decide the issue. Guzman v. State, 955 S.W.2d 85, 87 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997). If the resolution of mixed questions of law and fact requires an evaluation of a witness's credibility and demeanor, appellate courts should afford almost total deference to the trial court's ruling. Id. at 89. If the issue does not require such an evaluation, then appellate courts may review the question de novo. Id.
The determination of whether collateral estoppel is applicable in a particular case is the type of question that we are required to review de novo. See United States v. Brackett, 113 F.3d 1396, 1398 (5th Cir. 1997) (stating that application of collateral estoppel is question of law that is reviewed de novo), cert. denied, _____ U.S. _____, 118 S. Ct. 341, 139 L. Ed. 2d 265 (1997). Such a question does not turn on an evaluation of credibility and demeanor, but on the application of legal principles to established facts.
Discussion
The State argues that the trial court was not collaterally estopped from relitigating the issue of probable cause because the legislature intended for ALR hearings to be civil proceedings, independent of any matter at issue at the related DWI trial. See Tex. Transp. Code Ann. Sec 724.048(a) (Vernon Pamph. 1998) (stating that determination of ALJ is civil matter, is independent of and not estoppel to any matter in issue in adjudication of criminal charge, and does not preclude litigation of same or similar facts in criminal prosecution). The State also argues that constitutional collateral estoppel is inapplicable to issues decided in ALR hearings because collateral estoppel is derived from the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment, which is not implicated becaus
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