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State v. Anderson4/27/1998
e license suspensions are not punishment. See Tharp v. State, 935 S.W.2d 157, 161 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996) (holding that driver's license suspension is not punishment); Stephens v. State, 806 S.W.2d 812, 816 (Tex. Crim. App. 1990) (explaining that Double Jeopardy Clause protects against re-prosecution for same offense following acquittal or conviction and protects against multiple punishments for same offense), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 929 (1991).
The Court of Criminal Appeals recently resolved the issue we face in this case in State v. Brabson, No. 1309-95, 1998 WL 75670 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 25, 1998). In that case and in the case before us, the issue is the same-whether the district attorney is estopped, in a criminal prosecution, from litigating the existence of probable cause to arrest in a motion to suppress hearing based on an ALJ finding in a prior administrative proceeding that DPS did not prove probable cause to arrest. Id. at *1. The Court held that constitutional collateral estoppel was not implicated, explaining that collateral estoppel as embodied in the Fifth Amendment "may `bar a later prosecution for a separate offense where the Government has lost an earlier prosecution involving the same facts.'" Id. at *1, n.2 (quoting United States v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705 (1993)).
The Court then examined whether administrative collateral estoppel was implicated. Id. at *1. The Court explained that administrative estoppel applies " hen an administrative agency is acting in a judicial capacity and resolves disputed issues of [ultimate] fact properly before it which the parties have had an adequate opportunity to litigate." Id. (alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Utah Constr. and Mining Co., 384 U.S. 394, 422 (1966)). Upon examining the requirements of administrative collateral estoppel, the Court held that the district attorney and DPS are not the same parties for administrative collateral estoppel purposes and, consequently, the district attorney is not precluded from litigating the issue of probable cause to arrest at the motion to suppress hearing. Id. at *2. The Court explained that because the district attorney did not have an opportunity to litigate the issue of probable cause at the ALR hearing, allowing the district attorney to litigate the issue at the suppression hearing would not subject the defendant to an unfair trial. Id. at *2, n.4 The Court also noted that in section 724.048(a)(3) of the Texas Transportation Code, the legislature expressly stated that the ALR hearing does not preclude the litigation of same or similar facts in a criminal prosecution. Id. at *3, n.6.
Therefore, following Brabson, we hold that the district attorney is not precluded from litigating probable cause to arrest at the hearing on the motion to suppress because the district attorney is not the same party as DPS and, thus, the district attorney did not have an opportunity to litigate the probable cause issue at the ALR hearing. We sustain the State's point of error, reverse the decision of the trial court, and remand this case to the trial court for further proceedings.
Karen Angelini
PUBLISH
JUDGMENT
In accordance with this court's opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court granting Anderson's motion to suppress is REVERSED AND REMANDED to the trial court for further proceedings.
SIGNED , 1998.
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