STATE v. DOWNEY2/27/1997
sented in the context of the defendant's claims of involuntariness and waiver. The issue of whether an unlawful seizure occurred was
never presented to the trial court and consequently, the trial court never made the necessary factual determinations regarding seizure. See State v. Medina, 228 Conn. 281, 301, 636 A.2d 351 (1994). Because the record is inadequate, we decline to review his claim.
B
The defendant also asserts that the statements should have been suppressed because the defendant did not make a valid waiver of his Miranda rights. We are unpersuaded.
" olice officers are not required to administer Miranda warnings to everyone whom they question." State v. Januszewski, 182 Conn. 142, 159, 438 A.2d 679 (1980), cert. denied, 453 U.S. 922, 101 S. Ct. 3159, 69 L. Ed. 2d 1005 (1981). The warnings are required only when the defendant is (1) in custody, and (2) subject to police interrogation. State v. Brown, 199 Conn. 47, 51, 505 A.2d 1225 (1986). "Custodial interrogation is `questioning initiated by law enforcement officers after a person has been taken into custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way.'" Id.
"The defendant bears the burden of proving custodial interrogation. . . . The trial court's determination of the historical circumstances surrounding the defendant's interrogation are questions of fact . . . which will not be overturned unless they are clearly erroneous. . . . In order to determine the ultimate issue of custody . . . we will conduct a scrupulous examination of the record . . . in order to ascertain whether, in light of the totality of circumstances, the trial court's finding is supported by substantial evidence." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. LaPointe, 237 Conn. 694, 725, 678 A.2d 942, cert. denied, ___ U.S. ___, 177 S. Ct. 484, 1362 L. Ed. 2d 378 (1996). "A person is in custody only if, in view of all the surrounding
circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed he was not free to leave. . . . The ultimate inquiry is simply whether there is a formal arrest or restraint on freedom of movement of the degree associated with a formal arrest." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) State v. Northrop, 213 Conn. 405, 413-14, 568 A.2d 439 (1990).
At the suppression hearing, the trial court found that the defendant was not in police custody at the time the statements were given. Our review of the record, however, leads us to the conclusion that trial court's determination was clearly erroneous. Although a police officer testified that he asked the defendant to come voluntarily to the police station, the totality of the circumstances reveals that the defendant was in custody at the time he made the statements. As soon as the police arrived at the scene, an officer handcuffed him and placed him in the back of a police cruiser. Although the handcuffs were removed an hour later, he remained in the company of at least one officer for the remainder of the evening and was even escorted to the men's room. See State v. Hoeplinger, 206 Conn. 278, 288, 537 A.2d 1010 (1988). He was at the station for approximately eight hours, during which time he was never informed that he was free to leave. See State v. Ostroski, 186 Conn. 287, 292, 440 A.2d 984, cert. denied, 459 U.S. 878, 103 S. Ct. 173, 74 L. Ed. 2d 142 (1982); cf. State v. Derrico, 181 Conn. 151, 154-55, 434 A.2d 356, cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1064, 101 S. Ct. 789, 66 L. Ed. 2d 607 (1980). Furthermore, he had no independent means of transportation to return home. State v. Hoeplinger, supra, 206 Conn. 278, 288. We conclude that for purposes of Miranda the defendant was in custody when
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