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STATE v. DOWNEY2/27/1997
ed that the statements were voluntarily made.
We find no persuasive evidence of involuntariness on the record before us. The record is devoid of evidence that the police used threats or overt psychological pressure to overcome his will. In addition, the evidence shows that the police were respectful of the defendant's rights. See State v. Medina, supra, 228 Conn. 294. He claims, however, that the element of coercion exists because he was interrogated while intoxicated and "confused." The police officers who interrogated the defendant testified at trial that, although the defendant had been drinking the evening of the shooting, he spoke clearly and without confusion. A defendant's emotional state alone does not render a statement involuntary. See State v. Byrd, 34 Conn. App. 368, 641 A.2d 818 (1994), aff'd in part and remanded for further proceedings, 233 Conn. 517, 659 A.2d 1201 (1995), aff'd, 239 Conn. 405, 685 A.2d 669 (1996). Moreover, the defendant did not confess to murdering the victim; his explanation of events was entirely exculpatory. Furthermore, the record does not show that the defendant suffered from a disabling educational, intellectual or psychological deficit so severe as to overcome his will. See State v. Northrop, supra, 213 Conn. 420.
III
The defendant finally claims that the trial court improperly admitted evidence that the defendant had acted in a threatening manner toward the victim in the weeks before the shooting. We disagree.
"` vidence of prior acts of misconduct is inadmissible merely to show a defendant's bad character or tendency to commit criminal acts.'" State v. Thomas, 205 Conn. 279, 286, 533 A.2d 553 (1987). " uch evidence `may be allowed for the purpose of proving . . . intent motive . . . .'" (Emphasis in original.) Id. "The
trial judge, however, must determine in the exercise of judicial discretion that its probative value outweighs its prejudicial tendency." State v. Wild, 43 Conn. App. 458, 463, 684 A.2d 720 (1996). A trial court's decision will be reversed only where there is a manifest abuse of discretion or if it appears that injustice will result. Id.
The defendant objected to the evidence that the defendant had made disparaging remarks to the victim and had pointed at her with a gun-like motion. The trial court overruled the defendant's objection and gave limiting instructions to the jury immediately after the evidence was introduced and again in its final charge that the evidence was to be considered only to prove motive and intent. On appeal, the defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion because the evidence was not relevant and was exceedingly prejudicial.
The defendant admitted shooting the victim, but claimed that the incident was an accident. He also claimed that his relationship with the victim was a good one with no problems. The evidence that the defendant's relationship with the victim had deteriorated and that he acted in a threatening manner are relevant to his motive and intent. See State v. Thomas, supra, 205 Conn. 286. Furthermore, any potential prejudice was cured by the limiting instructions. See State v. Wild, 43 Conn. App. 458, 464, 684 A.2d 720, cert. denied, 239 Conn. 954, 688 A.2d 326 (1996). We conclude that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in admitting the evidence.
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