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State v. Laplante11/16/2004
Andrew Laplante ("Appellant") appeals his conviction for Driving While Intoxicated on the grounds that the trial court erroneously construed the meaning of "motor vehicle" in the Driving While Intoxicated Statute to include motorized bicycles. We affirm.
On May 3, 2002, at approximately 2:11 a.m., Officer Brian Phillips of the Springfield Police Department observed two mini-bikes, operating without lights, traveling northbound on John Q. Hammons Parkway. One of the mini-bikes was a Honda mini-bike, and the other was what appeared to be a homemade model. When Phillips observed that the operators of the mini-bikes failed to stop at the stop sign at the four-way intersection with Elm Street, he stopped the drivers for committing the traffic violation. Appellant was driving one mini-bike, and his friend, Donnie Bunker, was driving the second one.
As Officer Phillips engaged in conversation with Appellant, he noticed that Appellant's eyes were bloodshot. Phillips asked Appellant if he had been consuming intoxicants and Appellant replied that he had. Meanwhile, Officer Sean Patton of the Springfield Police Department had arrived on the scene, and Phillips turned Appellant over to Patton to investigate whether he was impaired while driving his vehicle. Officer Patton administered several field sobriety tests on Appellant and concluded that Appellant was under the influence of intoxicants and that he could not safely operate a motor vehicle. Patton then arrested Appellant and transported him to the Greene County Jail. At the jail, Patton administered a breathalyzer test on Appellant, and the test results showed that Appellant had blood alcohol content of .102.
The state subsequently charged Appellant with the crimes of Driving While Intoxicated and Disobeying a Stop Sign. At the close of the state's case, Appellant moved for acquittal because the state had not shown beyond a reasonable doubt that he was driving a motor vehicle, as required by Missouri's Driving While Intoxicated Statute. Rather, Appellant argued, he was driving a motorized bicycle, a vehicle that is excluded from the definition of motor vehicle in section 302.010(9). [FN1] The court took the motion under advisement. Bunker, Appellant's driving companion, who is also a professional motocross racer, then testified on behalf of Appellant and explained that Appellant's mini-bike had an engine size of 49 cubic centimeters and a top speed of around 22-25 miles per hour. On January 27, 2003 the court overruled Appellant's motion for acquittal and found Appellant guilty on both counts.
Statutory construction is a question of law, not fact, and the lower court's ruling on a question of law is not a matter of judicial discretion. State v. Ruch, 926 S.W.2d 937, 938 (Mo.App. W.D.1996). Thus, appellate courts conduct an independent review of the lower court's statutory interpretation and afford no deference to its ruling. Harrison v. King, 7 S.W.3d 558, 561 (Mo.App. E.D.1999). Absent an erroneous declaration or application of the law, however, we will sustain the judgment of the trial court. Id.; Murphy v. Carron, 536 S.W.2d 30, 32 (Mo. banc 1976).
The Driving While Intoxicated Statute, section 577.010, applies to any person who "operates a motor vehicle while in an intoxicated or drugged condition." Because chapter 577 does not explicitly define "motor vehicle," we must interpret the legislative intent of the statute to determine whether the mini-bike in this case should properly be considered a motor vehicle. We note that Respondent, by failing to file a brief, declined to aid in our construction of the statute. Although no penalty exists for such an omission, the failure requires this Court to adjudicate Appellant's claim of error without the benefit of Respondent's poten
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