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Prescott v. Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds1/10/1997
Insurance, Motor vehicle insurance, Surcharge. Evidence, Accident report.
DREBEN, J. After an accident, Rosemarie Prescott's insurer, Middlesex Insurance Company, sent her a surcharge notice stating that it had determined that she was more than fifty percent at fault in the accident, and that, as a consequence, her automobile insurance premium would be increased on her next renewal. The Board of Appeal on Motor Vehicle Liability Policies and Bonds (board) upheld the surcharge, but on Prescott's appeal under G. L. c. 175, § 113P, a Superior Court Judge determined that the board's decision was "unsupported by substantial evidence." G. L. c. 30A, § 14. We affirm.
1. The board's decision sets forth the following facts:
"Appellant Rose Marie Prescott submitted written testimony that on September 22, 1993 appellant was involved in a motor vehicle accident at approximately 11:55 PM. The accident location was on West Elm Street at the intersection with West Street in Brockton, Massachusetts. The weather was not a factor. The basis of appellant Rose Marie Prescott's appeal was that the claimant was drunk, speeding and had no license at the time of the collision. The collision occurred as the appellant entered the intersection from a stop sign on West Elm St. The police report does state the claimant operator was driving after suspension, but does not indicate any other violation as alleged by the appellant. The appellant was cited for a stop sign violation, appealed this citation and was found not responsible at a magistrate hearing. (See Addendum A)."
Noting that its decision was in accordance with 211 Code Mass. Regs. § 74.04(08) (1986), set forth in the margin, the board determined that "ample evidence supports the Board's Conclusion that [Prescott] did not use due caution when proceeding through a stop sign into the path of the approaching vehicle."
We agree with the Judge that that Conclusion is not supported by substantial evidence. "'Substantial evidence' means such evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a Conclusion." G. L. c. 30A, § 1(6), inserted by St. 1954, c. 681, § 1. The only evidence in the record consists of Prescott's accident report filed with the Registrar of Motor Vehicles, her statement which she authorized to be used in place of her personal appearance, a police report, and the determination of "no responsibility" by the Brockton District Court. The accident report, if any, of the other driver is not included in the record.
Prescott's material, not surprisingly, placed the blame on the other driver who, she claimed, was speeding. The police report is not to the contrary and merely states:
" D1095781 to # 1 for oper. aft. susp. She stated # 2 just pulled out in front of her. Cit. # D0333000 was issued to # 2. She stated she stopped at sign and was edging out when # 1 who was speeding hit her."
Both the police report and the plaintiff's accident report indicate that the damage was to the front end of the plaintiff's car and to the front right, right side, and right rear tire of the other car.
The only evidence from which the board could reach its Conclusion that the plaintiff either failed to obey the stop sign or "failed to proceed with caution therefrom" were the fact that an accident had occurred, the extent and location of the damage to the vehicles, and operator # 2's statement to the police that the plaintiff "just pulled out in front of ." The mere fact of an accident does not show lack of caution; similarly, the area of damage to the cars does not indicate lack of caution without reference to the conditions of visibility and the speed of the o
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