Gardner v. State2/21/1997
In this case, we are asked to decide an issue that was not presented, and, thus, was not answered, in Whack v. State, 338 Md. 665, 659 A.2d 1347 (1995): whether a sentence on a single count of an indictment or information may be enhanced pursuant to both Maryland Code (1957, 1992 Replacement Volume) Article 27, § 286(c) and § 293. The Circuit Court for Baltimore City answered that query in the affirmative. Viewing the issue as one of statutory construction, the Court of Special Appeals issued an unpublished opinion affirming that judgment. Having issued certiorari at the petitioner Robert Lee Gardner's request, we shall reverse the judgment of the intermediate appellate court.
I.
Although the issue it presents is complex, the facts of this case are not. The petitioner was convicted by a jury of possession of heroin and possession of heroin with the intent to distribute. Having previously been served, in accordance with Maryland Rule 4-245 , with both a "Notice of Additional Penalties," and a "Notice of Mandatory Penalties," he was sentenced for the possession with intent to distribute count , pursuant to both §§ 286(c) and 293, to 25 years imprisonment, the first 10 of which were to be served without benefit of parole. The petitioner noted an appeal challenging the sentence. The Court of Special Appeals rejected the petitioner's arguments and affirmed the circuit court. As indicated, we granted certiorari to address this important issue.
II.
The petitioner argues that a single count may not be enhanced under both § 286(c) and § 293(a). Therefore, noting that in Whack, 338 Md. at 682, 659 A.2d at 1355, we did not address the issue of "whether a sentence enhanced by the second offender provision of § 286(c) may also be enhanced by the second or subsequent offender provision of § 293," he urges that the judgment of the intermediate appellate court be reversed.
On the other hand, the State argues that the trial court correctly sentenced the petitioner, pursuant to § 286(c) and § 293(a), to 25 years, without parole for the first ten years. It urges this Court to apply the reasoning it employed in Whack to affirm the judgment of the circuit court.
III.
The matter before us is, as the Court of Special Appeals recognized, one of statutory construction. We have said that an enhanced penalty may not be imposed unless that is clearly the intent of the Legislature. Calhoun v. State, 290 Md. 1, 425 A.2d 1361 (1981), aff'g 46 Md. App. 478, 418 A.2d 1241 (1980). Thus, we are called upon to ascertain and effectuate the intent of the legislature, Parrison v. State, 335 Md. 554, 559, 644 A.2d 537, 539 (1994), to determine whether, when the General Assembly enacted Article 27, §§ 286(c) and 293(a), it intended that both statutes should be applied to enhance the sentence imposed by the court on a single count. "To determine legislative intent, 'we look first to the words of the statute , read in light of the full context in which they appear, and in the light of external manifestations of intent or general purpose available through other evidence'." Dickerson v. State, 324 Md. 163, 170-171, 596 A.2d 648, 651-52 (1991) (emphasis added) (quoting Cunningham v. State, 318 Md. 182, 185, 567 A.2d 126, 127 (1989)). See also State v. Bricker, 321 Md. 86, 92, 581 A.2d 9, 12 (1990); Davis v. State, 319 Md. 56, 60, 570 A.2d 855, 857 (1990); Kaczorowski v. City of Baltimore, 309 Md. 505, 513, 525 A.2d 628, 632 (1987). This is the primary source from which legislative intent is determined. Rose v. Fox Pool, 335 Md. 351, 359, 643 A.2d 906, 910 (1994); Armstead v. State, 342 Md. 38, 673 A.2d 221 (1996). Thus, to construe these statutes, we give the w
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