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Jeffries v. State1/29/1997
ther crimes." See, moreover, Oken v. State, 327 Md. 628, 665-70, 612 A.2d 258 (1992). The gunshot wound in the appellant's arm, per se, no more implies that he was previously involved in crime than it implies that he is a decorated and valorous hero of the Persian Gulf. Indeed, were Heather McDonald to be called as a witness in some future case, the eight gunshot scars she would then be carrying would by no means imply that she had a criminal record.
Admission of Hearsay Evidence
The fourth argument which the appellant raises on appeal is that hearsay evidence was improperly admitted at trial. Specifically, the appellant complains of the testimony of Dr. Daniel Powers, the surgeon who treated Ms. McDonald immediately after the incident. At trial, Dr. Powers identified notes of one of the nurses on duty in a toxicology report which said that Ms. McDonald recalled the incident vividly. Subsequent to Dr. Powers's testimony, the lab report containing the controversial remark was admitted into evidence as a medical record of Ms. McDonald. On appeal, the appellant maintains that the evidence was hearsay improperly admitted at trial.
Again, we need not address the merits of the appellant's contention due to a lack of preservation. Although defense counsel objected to the report during the State's redirect examination of Dr. Powers, the appellant failed to object when the report was admitted into evidence. Hence, where testimony that comprises the basis of an earlier objection comes in later without objection, the earlier objection is waived for the purpose of appellate review. Peisner v. State, 236 Md. 137, 144, 202 A.2d 585 (1964). Because the appellant failed to object to the admission of the report, he has waived any complaint he may have had.
If the merits of the contention were properly before us, the result would not be different. The evidence of Ms. McDonald's vivid recall was offered after defense counsel had elicited testimony regarding her blood alcohol level. The clear effect of that was to impeach her ability accurately to perceive, to remember, and to narrate the critical events. The observations in question of the duty nurse served to rehabilitate that questioned capacity to observe, to remember, and to narrate. The nurse's observations of Ms. McDonald's conversation were offered not for the substance of what Ms. McDonald said (that would be hearsay) but for the way in which she said them (that is classic non-hearsay).
Voluntariness of the Appellant's Statement
The appellant also claims that a statement that he made at the police station at approximately 9:15 on the morning of the incident was involuntary and should have been suppressed at trial. The appellant sets forth several circumstances that he believes warrant a finding of involuntariness and, therefore, necessitate reversal.
We disagree. Making our own independent determination of the voluntariness of the appellant's statement based on the record of the suppression hearing, see Riddick v. State, 319 Md. 180, 183, 571 A.2d 1239 (1990), we find ample evidence to support the admission of the statement at trial. For example, Detective Fallon, the officer who accompanied the appellant to the hospital, testified at trial that the appellant was given his Miranda warnings and was not on any medication. The detective further observed that the appellant appeared sober, seemed to understand the questions being asked, and, while at the police station, was "very congenial, very cooperative." The questioning of the appellant was approximately fifteen minutes in duration, and the appellant signed his statement after he had "looked it over." Furthermore, there was no evidence
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