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State v. Egelhoff7/6/1995
minal intent without proof by the government, which was determined to be inconsistent with our philosophy of criminal law.
Our concern here is with proof of the mental state element of the offense of deliberate homicide. The evidence presented at trial established that Egelhoff had a level of intoxication measured at .36. It is clear that such evidence was relevant to the issue of whether Egelhoff acted knowingly and purposely; yet Instruction No. 11 precluded the jury from considering it for that purpose.
The prosecution presented a great deal of evidence which reflected on Egelhoff's ability to shoot Pavola and Christianson despite his level of intoxication. That evidence included the following: In order to commit the crimes, he had to take the gun from the glove compartment of the vehicle. He made an attempt to flee after he went into the ditch. He tried to avoid detection when Rebecca Garrison tried to approach the car. Ms. Garrison noticed a stick which she assumed must have been used by Egelhoff to depress the accelerator so that Egelhoff could drive from the back seat. He could talk. At the IGA store at 9:20 p.m., Egelhoff spoke well and did not slur his words. He later told Ms. Garrison to "stay away" and he talked to the ambulance driver. He had physical energy and strength. He tried to avoid detection by another of the witnesses who had stopped to give assistance. Detective Bernall testified that his coordination was good as was demonstrated by his kicking of the camera. The evidence was presented by the State to establish that Egelhoff acted "purposely" or "knowingly." Such evidence could be properly considered by the jury in its determination of whether or not he acted "purposely" or "knowingly."
However, Egelhoff was not allowed to rebut such evidence with evidence that his level of intoxication precluded him from forming the requisite mental state. As a result of the elimination of the opportunity of using this rebuttal evidence, the prosecution's burden of proof for the element of mental state was reduced.
This is a denial of due process. Due process is "the right to a fair opportunity to defend against the State's accusations." Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284, 294, 93 S.Ct. 1038, 1045, 35 L.Ed.2d 297, 308. This right to present a defense is fundamental. Chambers, 410 U.S. at 302, 93 S.Ct. at 1049, 35 L.Ed.2d at 312. In Martin v. Ohio (1987), 480 U.S. 228, 233, 107 S.Ct. 1098, 1101, 94 L.Ed.2d 267, 274, the United States Supreme Court upheld a conviction of murder where the defendant attempted to prove self defense. The Supreme Court held it was not a violation of due process to place the burden of proving self defense on a defendant charged with committing aggravated murder. The Court in Martin emphasized that the defendant had the opportunity under the law and instructions to justify the killing by showing herself blameless because she acted in self defense. As a part of that discussion the Martin Court then stated:
It would be quite different if the jury had been instructed that self-defense evidence could not be considered in determining whether there was a reasonable doubt about the State's case, i.e., that self-defense evidence must be put aside for all purposes unless it satisfied the preponderance standard. Such instruction would relieve the State of its burden and plainly run afoul of Winship's mandate. 397 U.S., at 364, 90 S.Ct. at 1072-73. The instructions in this case could be clearer in this respect, but when read as a whole, we think they are adequate to convey to the jury that all of the evidence, including the evidence going to self-defense, must be considered in deciding whether there was a reaso
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