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State v. Egelhoff7/6/1995
ssential element of the crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt, and you must, therefore, acquit me."
In short, the language ". . . and may not be taken into consideration in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense . . ." (emphasis added) inserted in the 1987 and subsequent versions of § 45-2-203, MCA, effectively and impermissibly relieves or lessens the burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of the offense charged — the mental state element — by statutorily precluding the jury from considering the very evidence that might convince them that the State had not proven that element.
It remains the burden of the State to prove beyond a reasonable doubt mental state despite the defendant being intoxicated. The statutory language at issue here eliminates or lessens that burden and is, therefore, constitutionally infirm.
Under § 45-2-203, MCA, and our decision here, a voluntarily intoxicated defendant remains criminally responsible for his conduct and his voluntarily intoxicated condition continues not to be a defense to any offense. However, the defendant's intoxicated condition may be taken into consideration by the finder of fact in determining the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense charged.
JUSTICE GRAY joins in the foregoing special concurrence.
CHIEF JUSTICE TURNAGE, specially concurring:
I respectfully specially concur, specifically to the majority opinion holding that the opinion will apply retroactively to those cases still subject to final decision on direct review on the date of this opinion but will not apply retroactively to cases on collateral review after the date of this opinion.
I further specially concur and urge the next session of the Montana legislative assembly to amend § 45-2-203, MCA, to eliminate the problem this Court finds to exist in the 1987 amended version of this statute. I would recommend that the legislature consider amending § 45-2-203, MCA, to reinstate the provisions thereof that existed in the 1985 version of this statute. Such amendment would essentially reinstate language that " n intoxicated or drugged condition may be taken into consideration in determination of the existence of a mental state which is an element of the offense."
JUSTICE TRIEWEILER specially concurring in part and dissenting in part.
I concur with the majority's conclusion that the stricken portions of § 45-2-203, MCA (1993), violated Egelhoff's right to due process, and therefore, were unconstitutional. However, I do not agree with all that is said in the majority opinion.
I specifically disagree that a principle of constitutional law can be made applicable to some citizens and not others.
In my view, the role of this Court is to interpret the Constitution and apply it to the parties before it. Whether the parties come before this Court by direct appeal, or by statutorily authorized collateral review, is irrelevant. The protections afforded by the Constitution apply to everyone. It makes no sense to have different interpretations based on the procedure by which an unconstitutionally treated person arrives in our Court.
The majority relies on Teague v. Lane (1989), 489 U.S. 288, 109 S.Ct. 1060, 103 L.Ed.2d 334, for the principle that "new" rules of constitutional law must be applied to all cases still subject to review, but only under limited circumstances to cases which are collaterally reviewed. Teague, and the U.S. Supreme Court's earlier decision in Griffith v. Kentucky (1987), 479 U.S. 314, 107 S.Ct. 708, 93 L.Ed.2d 649
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