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State v. Sufronko8/4/1995
KLINE, Judge.
Defendant-appellant, Dale Sufronko, was charged with forgery in violation of R.C. 2913.31(A)(1) for signing his brother's name on three documents presented to appellant by an Ohio State Highway Patrol Trooper during the course of an arrest. The Athens County Court of Common Pleas found appellant guilty following a bench trial and sentenced him on the forgery conviction. Appellant challenges the conviction, asserting the following assignment of error:
"The trial court erred in finding defendant guilty, as R.C. Section 1.51 requires that a defendant who knowingly signs the name of another with purpose to mislead a police officer may be charged and convicted of the specific offense of falsification, R.C. Section 2921.13(A.)(3), but not the general offense of forgery, R.C. Section 2913.31(A)(1)."
Appellant was arrested and charged with driving under the influence and driving left of center by Ohio State Patrol Trooper Troy Johnson. Trooper Johnson initially issued the citations to "David Sufronko," as this was the name given by the appellant. During the course of the arrest, appellant signed three documents as "David Sufronko," who is, in fact, appellant's brother. David Sufronko had not authorized appellant to sign his name to these documents.
After failing to appear in court to answer the traffic charges, appellant was arrested on a failure to appear warrant.
Appellant was then indicted on one count of forgery, in violation of R.C. 2913.31(A)(1), and on one count of uttering, in violation of R.C. 2913.31(A)(3). Following a bench trial, appellant was found guilty of forgery and not guilty of uttering. The trial court sentenced appellant on the forgery conviction and appellant timely filed a notice of appeal from the sentence and judgment.
Appellant asserts that the state erred by indicting him with forgery under R.C. 2913.31(A)(1), a general statute, when he should have been charged with falsification under R.C. 2921.13(A)(3), a special provision. Appellant maintains that the General Assembly intended appellant to be charged with a misdemeanor under the special provision of falsification, rather than a felony under the general statute of forgery, for his conduct.
When interpreting statutes and their application, an appellate court conducts a de novo review, without deference to the trial court's determination. This court will first look to the issue of whether an R.C. 1.51 analysis is necessary.
Principles of statutory construction require that specific statutory provisions prevail over conflicting general statutes. State v. Volpe (1988), 38 Ohio St.3d 191, 193, 527 N.E.2d 818, 820-821. Where there is no manifest legislative intent that a general provision of the Revised Code prevails over a special provision, the special provision takes precedence. Id. at paragraph one of the syllabus; State v. Frost (1979), 57 Ohio St.2d 121, 11 O.O.3d 294, 387 N.E.2d 235; State v. King (1991), 81 Ohio App.3d 210, 212, 610 N.E.2d 1028, 1019-1030. Appellant relies on R.C. 1.51, which states that:
"If a general provision conflicts with a special or local provision, they shall be construed, if possible, so that effect is given to both. If the conflict between the provisions is irreconcilable, the special or local provision prevails as an exception to the general provision, unless the general provision is the later adoption and the manifest intent is that the general provision prevail."
In determining the applicability of R.C. 1.51, the court must first ascertain whether the two statutes of forgery and falsification present an i
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