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Davies v. State2/19/2003
court deferred ruling on the motion and only subsequently ruled on it.
Therefore, we hold that the trial court did not err when it found appellant guilty of driving while intoxicated because the trial court did not grant appellant's motion for directed verdict. For his argument, appellant relies on United States v. Dossey, 558 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1977). In that case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit cited United States v. House, 551 F.2d 756 (8th Cir. 1977), for the proposition that a district court errs by reserving its ruling on a motion for a judgment of acquittal made at the close of the government's case. However, in House, the same court made it clear that this holding was premised upon the then-extant version of Fed. R. Crim. P. 29, governing motions for judgment of acquittal. Since then, Rule 29 has been amended and now expressly authorizes district courts to reserve rulings on motions for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the government's case. United States v. Habhab, 132 F.3d 410 (8th Cir. 1997). Furthermore, Ark. R. Crim. P. 33.1 (2002), governing motions for a directed verdict in Arkansas state courts, neither addresses, nor prohibits trial courts from reserving rulings on motions for a directed verdict at the close of the State's case. Thus, we find appellant's reliance on Dossey and House inapposite.
Notably, even if House applied, the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit identified certain circumstances in which the failure to rule on a motion for judgment of acquittal made at the close of the government's case is not reversible error because it is nonprejudical to the defendant. United States v. House, supra. When "at the time the motion was made, the Government had produced sufficient evidence to justify submission of the case to the jury," one such circumstance exists. House, 551 F.2d at 758.
Here, appellant was convicted of driving while intoxicated. The State had submitted evidence that appellant had been sitting in his vehicle, while intoxicated, with the engine running. The vehicle stood on private property when the police officer found appellant sitting in it. However, this fact, under established Arkansas law, does not bear upon the success of a charge of driving while intoxicated. Hill v. State, 315 Ark. 297, 868 S.W.2d 44 (1993). Consequently, the State's evidence constituted sufficient evidence.
Affirmed.
Robbins and Bird, JJ., agree.
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