Clampet v. State3/6/2003
This appeal was certified to us from the court of appeals so that we can once again address a trial court's authority to modify a defendant's probation under Act 346 of 1975. Appellant Raymond Clampet was charged with first-degree criminal mischief, a Class C felony, on October 9, 1996, after he smashed out the windows on his wife's truck with a tire iron. In April of 1997, Clampet entered a plea of guilty to this charge, and the trial court sentenced him to three years' probation pursuant to Act 346 of 1975; the court also imposed $500.00 "restitution in lieu of a fine," and $1,124.10 in victim restitution. The order of probation was entered on April 24, 1997.
On February 11, 1999, the State filed a petition for revocation of Clampet's probation, alleging that he had failed (1) to report to his probation officer, (2) to pay court costs and restitution as ordered, and (3) to report a change of address. On May 10, 1999, the trial court held a hearing at which it found Clampet in violation of his probation, but declined to revoke his probation. The judge stated, "However, your Act 346 status will be revoked and your plea of guilty accepted. You'll be found in contempt for violating the court's orders and sentenced to 120 days in jail with credit for 12 days served." (Emphasis added.) In addition, the court extended Clampet's period of probation for twenty- four additional months, and ordered him to pay the balance of what he owed on his restitution.
On July 2, 2001, the State filed another petition for revocation of probation, alleging that Clampet had failed (1) to report to his probation officer, (2) to remain in his treatment program, and (3) to report his change of address. This petition was amended in August of 2001 to add an additional allegation of committing the offenses of driving while intoxicated and driving on a suspended license. Clampet moved to dismiss the petition, based on lack of subject matter jurisdiction, because on May 10, 1999, the court had revoked his Act 346 status and accepted his guilty plea. At a hearing on August 13, 2001, the trial court denied Clampet's motion to dismiss.
At a subsequent revocation hearing, held on August 27, 2001, Clampet admitted to part of the factual allegations contained in the revocation petition, and the trial court found him in violation of his probation, revoked it, and sentenced him to 42 months in the Department of Correction, with an additional 30 months suspended. The court gave Clampet credit for 160 days and directed that he complete a substance abuse program. From this order, Clampet brings his appeal, arguing that the trial court erred in denying his motion to dismiss the 2001 petition to revoke his probation. He argues that the court lost subject-matter jurisdiction when it previously revoked his Act 346 status.
Because Clampet was charged and placed on probation in 1996, this case is governed by the sentencing law in effect prior to the passage of Act 1569 of 1999. That Act changed the statutes governing a trial court's authority to modify or amend the terms and conditions of a defendant's probation. However, in Bagwell v. State, 346 Ark. 18, 53 S.W.3d 520 (2001), we declined to apply that Act retroactively, and therefore, our prior case law on the subject -- including Pike v. State, 344 Ark. 478, 40 S.W.3d 795 (2000), and McGhee v. State, 334 Ark. 543, 975 S.W.2d 834 (1998) - controls.
This court has consistently held that a trial court loses jurisdiction to modify or amend an original sentence once a valid sentence is put into execution. See, e.g., McGhee, supra; Harmon v. State, 317 Ark. 47, 876 S.W.2d 240 (1994); DeHart v. State, 312 Ark. 323, 849 S.W.2d 497 (1993); Jones v. State, 29
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