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Motor Vehicle Administration v. Richards10/14/1999
ence for such proceedings. Therefore, in this context, the exclusionary rule, designed to deter such violations, is not particularly useful." (footnote omitted)); Com., Dept. of Transp. v. Wysocki, 535 A.2d 77, 79 (Pa. 1987) (stating that basis for employing Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule is to deter police officials from engaging in improper conduct for purpose of obtaining criminal convictions). Cf. 1995 Corvette, 353 Md. at 138, 724 A.2d at 692, (with respect to law enforcement forfeitures, noting that "governments increasingly have filed civil forfeiture actions in lieu of criminal charges, knowing that constitutional protections provide greater obstacles to their criminal cases, and that forfeitures have a great financial impact only on the defendant but on the government's coffers as well"). Finally, as we have stated in the past, police officers still will be deterred from violating drivers' constitutional rights despite the non-exclusion of evidence in administrative license proceedings because they are subject to other penalties and civil liabilities for engaging in such conduct. See Chase v. State, 309 Md. 224, 253, 522 A.2d 1348, 1362 (1987).
In contrast to the limited deterrent value, the costs of applying the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment in hearings under § 16-205.1(f) are great. The underlying purpose of administrative license suspensions, the protection of the public, would be undermined. See Powell, 614 A.2d at 1307. Whereas the General Assembly has given high priority to the enforcement of drunk driving laws and its expected increase in the safety of Maryland's roadways, see generally Department of Legislative Reference, Bill Files for Senate Bill 398 and House Bill 556 (1989), we agree with the Conclusion of the Supreme Judicial Court of Maine that
the application of fourth amendment principles would add an undue burden to license suspension hearings. . . . license suspension hearing is not a quasi-criminal proceeding, but rather a "reasonable regulatory measure to protect public safety." Requiring hearing examiners to apply the exclusionary rule would unnecessarily complicate and burden an administrative proceeding designed to focus on the single issue of whether a person was operating a vehicle with excessive alcohol in his blood.
Powell, 614 A.2d at 1307.
In Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 301, 711 A.2d 1319, 1327 (1998), we observed that proceedings like those under § 16-205.1 are intended to be informal and summary in nature. See also Riche, 987 S.W.2d at 334 (concluding that extending the exclusionary rule to administrative license suspension hearings "would impose significant costs to society . . . would unnecessarily complicate and burden an administrative process designed to remove drunken drivers from Missouri's roads and highways as quickly as possible."). Affording licensees the opportunity to invoke the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment in license suspension proceedings would not only interfere with the informal and summary nature of those proceedings but also alter their purposefully limited scope, as prescribed under § 16-205.1(f)(7). Cf. Scott, 524 U.S. at , 118 S. Ct. at 2020-21 (finding that application of exclusionary rule would significantly alter traditionally flexible and informal administrative procedures of parole revocation because exclusionary rule frequently requires extensive litigation that is inconsistent with non-adversarial, administrative processes); I.N.S. v. Lopez- Mendoza, 468 U.S. 1032, 1048, 104 S. Ct. 3479, 3488, 82 L. Ed. 2d 778 (1984) (observing that prospect of even occasional invocation of exclusionary rule might significantly change and complicate character of deportation system).
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