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Motor Vehicle Administration v. Richards10/14/1999
r the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment (1) applies in the civil administrative driver's license suspension proceeding provided for under §16-205.1(f) and (2) thus bars introduction of evidence based on a purportedly unlawful motor vehicle stop, when an administrative law Judge has found that the officer conducting the stop had a good faith basis for taking that action.
As the petitioner in this case, the MVA argues that the license suspension proceeding under § 16-205.1(f) does not fall within any exception to the general rule that the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment does not apply to civil proceedings. The MVA further contends that the marginal benefits of applying the exclusionary rule to this proceeding are far outweighed by the substantial social costs its application would impose.
Respondent counters that regardless of legislative enactments or administrative rule-making, the exclusionary rule applies to "refusal hearings" under § 16-205.1 because of the nature and purpose of those hearings:
Since the refusal to take the test is the crux of the refusal hearing, is inadmissible in the criminal proceeding[ ] and clearly does not provide any evidence of intoxication vel non, the administrative sanction is clearly punitive. As a purely punitive measure, the refusal hearing is more in the nature of a quasi-criminal proceeding such as in One 1995 Corvette . . . .
Respondent's Brief at 7. The case to which Respondent refers, One 1995 Corvette v. Baltimore, 353 Md. 114, 724 A.2d 680 (1999), is a recent decision by this Court in which we held the exclusionary rule of the Fourth Amendment applicable in civil in rem forfeiture proceedings. See also One 1958 Plymouth Sedan v. Pennsylvania, 380 U.S. 693, 85 S. Ct. 1246, 14 L. Ed. 2d 170 (1965).
II.
Central to this case are the purpose, legal effect and constitutional ramifications of Maryland's "implied consent, administrative per se" motor vehicle law, codified as §16-205.1 of the Transportation Article. In 1988, the General Assembly established a Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving "because `the problem of drunk and drugged driving is of continuing concern to the citizens of the State of Maryland.'" Motor Vehicle Admin. v. Gaddy, 335 Md. 342, 347, 643 A.2d 442, 444 (1994) (quoting Joint Resolution No. 15 of the Acts of 1988). As we reiterated last year,
Among the several matters studied by that task force were (1) an administrative per se law, making both the refusal to take an alcohol test and the taking of such a test that revealed 0.10 or greater alcohol concentration an administrative offense that would lead to the rapid and mandated suspension of the offender's driver's license, and (2) a criminal per se law, that would make driving with an alcohol concentration of 0.10 or more a per se criminal offense. See Task Force on Drunk and Drugged Driving Minutes, September 13, 1988, September 27, 1988, October 13, 1988.
Janes v. State, 350 Md. 284, 304, 711 A.2d 1319, 1329 (1998).
The Task Force issued a report during the 1988 legislative interim which "addressed the possibility of establishing an administrative per se law to provide immediate suspension of a driver's license of a person detained by police on the suspicion of driving or attempting to drive while intoxicated or under the influence." Senate Judicial Proceedings Committee, Bill Analysis for Senate Bill 398, at 3 (1989). During the 1989 legislative session, the General Assembly acted upon the Task Force's recommendation and enacted an implied consent, administrative per se statute. The first two subsections of the statute establish that (1) by driving on a Maryland pub
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